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It is well known that innovation law and policy must strike a balance between 
incentivizing inventions on the one hand, and granting monopolies to successful 
innovators on the other. In achieving this balance, it is commonly presumed that 
actors in innovation markets respond to their economic environments just like 
anyone else (at least on a first approximation). This paper presents evidence to the 
contrary, using a series of controlled experiments. In our experiments, subjects 
were offered a choice between (a) a monetary payoff with certainty; and (b) a 
riskier (but potentially more lucrative) option. Our principal manipulation was to 
alter how the latter option was framed: subjects in the control group were presented 
with an unadorned choice between safe and risky options, while subjects in the 
treatment group were confronted with the identical economic choice, but with the 
risky option framed as an investment in an “innovation-related” project. We find 
strong evidence that when the risky choice was framed in this way, subjects 
exhibited significantly less risk aversion, and that they did so across many 
variations on the experimental setting. We calibrate our results to an equivalent 
downward “shock” that the innovation-related frame introduces to subjects’ 
manifest risk preferences. Our findings have implications for legal design 
questions, not only within intellectual property but also in other legal settings (such 
as venture capital) where the need to account for people’s risk tolerance plays an 
important role.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
An emerging common wisdom holds that courts have made it “too hard” to obtain patent 
protection in critical industries. The origin of this criticism dates back at least as far as the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2012 landmark opinion in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs,1 
which (the argument goes) triggered a chain reaction of judicial opinions rendering patent rights 
progressively more difficult to secure.2 And, barely three years after Mayo, a federal court cited it 
in invalidating a patent for a groundbreaking diagnostic test to detect fetal genetic conditions such 
as Downs Syndrome early in pregnancy.3 Before the test at issue was available, clinical diagnostic 
methods involved invasive techniques that materially endangered the health of the fetus. But in 
1996, doctors at Sequenom, Inc., a biotechnology company, discovered that maternal blood 
contains trace amounts of fetal DNA. Having made this discovery, the same team developed a 
noninvasive blood test that could screen for fetal genetic conditions without endangering the fetus. 
Sequenom’s invention garnered it significant acclaim and a trove of prestigious awards for medical 
innovation. The Federal Circuit was somewhat less impressed, and it invalidated the patent for 
failure to assert claims that were “significantly more” than a mere “natural law.”4  
Critics were quick to pounce.5 Invention is already risky and costly enough, they argued, 
and this opinion made patent protection not only harder but also unpredictable, undermining the 
incentives to develop and finance critical new inventions. As a result, they feared, risk-averse 
 
1 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). In Mayo, the Court invalidated a patent claim directed at determining the proper dosage of 
a thiopurine drug used to treat patients with autoimmune disease. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer 
held that the claim failed to satisfy the requirement of patentable subject matter because it was directed to a “law of 
nature.”  Id. at 1305. In 2014, the Supreme Court continued its expansion of the doctrine and invalidated a claim in 
the software field for failing the Mayo test for patentable subject matter. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2347 
(2014). In Alice, the Supreme Court held that the Mayo test also prohibited patenting abstract ideas. 
2  See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Cleveland Clinc Foundation v. True Health 
Diagnostics, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding a testing process created by the Cleveland Clinic to determine 
the risk for having atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease invalid because it was directed to a patent-ineligible law of 
nature); Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services LLC, 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019)(finding a 
diagnostic method claim patent ineligible as a natural law). 
3 Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The State of Patent Eligibility 
in America, Part II, 116th Cong. 6–7 (2019) (written testimony of Hans Sauer, Ph.D., Deputy General Counsel and 
Vice President for Intellectual Property, BIO) (“Absent the ability to protect their discoveries with valid patents . . . 
predictability that it has historically provided, that we have been able to make the investments, conduct the research, 
and take the risks required to develop these treatments. And only with predictability will we be able [to] solve 
today’s most challenging healthcare problems and develop the groundbreaking treatments of tomorrow. 
Unfortunately, the patent system in the United States today is anything but predictable.”).  
David J. Kappos, This U.S. Court Decision Just Quashed Innovation in Health Care, FORTUNE, Oct. 21, 2015 (“the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in June that declared a wide swath of healthcare innovation unpatentable threatens to 
impose just this sort of stagnation.”) 
4 Despite over twenty amici briefs from academics, industry, and interest groups who argued that patent protection is 
necessary for such inventions, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 
5 David O. Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Investment, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Halie Wimberly, The 
Changing Landscape of the Patent Subject Matter Eligibility and its Impact on Biotechnological Innovation, 54 
HOUS. L. REV. 995  (2017) (“This roadblock to intellectual property protection for biotechnological inventions, due 
both to the recent restrictions and to the uncertain legal standard, may slow growth of the industry that relies heavily 
on investment.”). 
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inventors and investors would stay away in droves, unjustly and inefficiently depriving society of 
many ground-breaking inventions such as Sequenom’s. As Judge Kimberly Moore of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained it in a recent dissent, “The math is simple, you need not 
be an economist to get it: Without patent protection to recoup the enormous R&D cost, investment 
in diagnostic medicine will decline. To put it simply, this is bad. It is bad for the health of the 
American people and the health of the American economy.”6 
The criticism recounted above seems intuitive, appealing and powerful. But is it right? In 
this article, we interrogate it by deploying experimental methods to measure people’s attitudes 
toward risk when investing in innovative activities. Although our inquiry produces a variety of 
insights, one in particular stands out: We uncover novel evidence that when confronted with an 
investment decision that is “innovation-related,” people appear to become far more tolerant of 
risks than they are in other, economically equivalent settings. This result appears to be significant 
and robust, and it holds up regardless of whether one controls for subjects’ age, gender, ethnicity, 
or several metrics of baseline risk aversion.  Our results also persist when we vary the quantitative 
and qualitative risks involved, so long as the investment is tied to innovation. The effect appears 
to weaken substantially, however, when a risky option is framed simply as an investment 
opportunity, shorn of any invention-related dimension. Our interpretation of these findings is that 
the pursuit of invention—in concert with investing—introduces a critical interaction that operates 
to dampen people’s manifested aversion to risk. In fact, we can even impute a quantitative size of 
this preference-dampening effect, by calibrating our results to a well-known set of risk tolerance 
measurement techniques in the economics literature.7 Here, for the median subject in our study, 
we estimate that the innovation-related frame induces a reduction of manifest risk aversion of just 
under one-half of a standard deviation relative to our overall subject population.8 
To the extent that our results are generalizable, they have obvious implications for the 
“Goldilocksian” conundrum of patent protection – balancing the need to incentivize investors and 
inventors against the economic distortions from granting limited monopoly rights to successful 
innovators. If inventors, entrepreneurs, and investors are comparatively more tolerant of risk in 
inventive settings, then patent policy may be able to incentivize value-enhancing innovation 
without allocating a “premium” to compensate investors for their aversion to risk. Moreover, our 
results have broad implications outside of intellectual property, and in particular to the fast-
developing areas of commercial and corporate law that must similarly wrestle with the question of 
how richly to incentivize financial investors in innovative industries. 
 Several caveats to our analysis deserve specific mention before proceeding. First, as with 
all experimental findings, ours are subject to questions about the generalizability of our results in 
light of the subject pool. All of our experiments make use of either university students or workers 
 
6 Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Serv., 927 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (denying petition for 
rehearing en banc). A petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court is currently pending. 
7 We calibrate manifested risk aversion using a common benchmarking first established by Charles Holt and Susan 
Laury. See Secton I, infra; Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1644 (2002). 
8 In addition, because (as explained below) our results hold even in the presence of presenting subjects with the 
possibility of negative payoffs, our results contrast with (though do not directly contradict) the predictions of Nobel 
Prize-winning work by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who found that preferences in the presence of 
negative payoffs (relative to a reference point) behave fundamentally differently from those with strictly positive 
payoffs. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 
453, 457-58 (1981). 
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on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (or “M-Turk”).9 Consequently, one might fairly question 
the representativeness of our subject pool relative to “real world” inventors and investors, who 
actually participate in day-to-day innovation markets. And, the use of M-Turkers is sometimes 
singled out for particular criticism in this regard within the experimental literature, since it 
represents a population that is less capable of experimental control than conventional lab 
subjects. 10  We confront these concerns along multiple fronts. Foremost, we make sure to 
compensate our subjects with real monetary payoffs, so as to motivate and induce them to 
internalize the core financial tradeoffs we wish to study. Additionally, our dual-population study 
design allows us to draw comparisons between the university and M-Turk populations. Although 
we confirm the existence of differences (both demographic and behavioral) between these two 
populations,11 the target result of interest here (i.e., how innovation framing interacts with risk 
tolerances) remains remarkably consistent between the groups.12 Although we cannot guarantee 
that these results would carry over to all “real world” actors, their persistence across multiple 
distinct subject pools is (at the very least) encouraging. 
 Second, although we believe our results deliver an important rejoinder to recent criticisms 
about courts’ burgeoning stinginess towards patent holders, they do so in a particular and focused 
way: by showing that accommodations for risk preferences are perhaps unnecessary (or at least 
less necessary than one might think) in innovative environments. A related (but distinct) criticism 
of the judicial opinions noted above is that they have simply made it less lucrative—even for a 
risk-neutral actor—to innovate or finance innovation, because (for example) copying is 
insufficiently deterred. Our results have little to say about this dimension of the debate, other than 
to suggest that we may be able to confront the copying problem on its own terms, without also 
having to make significant additional allowances for risk aversion. 
 The remainder of this article consists of four parts. Section I discusses the motivation and 
background for our study, with particular emphasis on the oft-asserted argument that within 
innovative industries, legal policy should accommodate risk aversion much like in other domains. 
Section II provides an overview of the experimental protocol, tying it to the relevant literature. 
Section III presents our core results, both for our baseline experiment and for a set of robustness 
experiments meant to stress test our core result to different environments. Section IV turns to 
implications, situating our findings within a variety of central legal puzzles regarding innovation. 
(A series of technical appendices contain background technical derivations and provide additional 
statistical results.) 
 
  
 
9 See www.mturk.com.  
10 See generally Matthew Crump et al., “Evaluating Amazon's Mechanical Turk as a Tool for Experimental 
Behavioral Research.” 8 PLoS One e57410 (2013) (reviewing the literature). 
11 Most notably, in addition to their demographic differences, M-Turkers manifest greater risk aversion, regardless 
of frame, than students on the Internet and in the lab.  See section IV.A.4, infra. 
12 Although there are many papers exploring whether results on M-Turk are different from those in the lab (see note 
98, supra), there have been none (that we can find) that consider the sort of framing that we utilize.  Our results 
appear to confirm that—despite their various observable differences from conventional subjects—M-Turkers can be 
used successfully to test the types of framing manipulations studied in this Article. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
 Before diving into our experimental enterprise, we first lay the foundation by providing a 
little background and context for our analysis. This section describes the contours of some of the 
critical behavioral theories that undergird much of intellectual property law and policy (focusing 
principally on patents). It further explores the assumptions that other scholars have made about the 
risks associated with intellectual property, including risks surrounding copying and risks 
surrounding creation. It then situates this literature against the literature on early-stage startup 
investing, where despite of the asserted risks there has long been significant appetite to invest. 
Finally, we provide the reader with a brief orientation on the experimental framing in psychology 
and behavioral economics to better motivate and elucidate our experimental design.  
 
A. Intellectual Property 
 
 The field of intellectual property (IP) is broadly constituted by patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, and trade secrets.  Patent law is the most relevant for this article, though our results 
have something to say about the others as well (and particularly copyrights).13 Patent rights are 
effectively monopolies awarded by the government to reward and incentivize inventors of new, 
useful, and non-obvious inventions.14  Copyrights—which are justified on the same economic 
theory as patents— protect original works of authorship, such as books and music.15   
 There are several junctures in the IP literature where incentives and risk preferences of the 
relevant actors are thought to play an important role for law and policy.  We consider them in turn 
below. 
 
 1.  Incentives for Inventing and Creating.  —  There is a long literature in economics, as 
well as in sociology and psychology, that attempts to explain why individuals and firms generate 
new creative and innovative works.  The classic insight from economic theory is that providing ex 
ante incentives (such as the limited exclusive rights embodied by patents) are necessary to 
encourage socially valuable generation of new works.  This economic theory, however, is 
comprised two parts.  First, even holding the unpredictability of innovation aside, successful 
inventors would face the prospect of copying.16  Once an inventor has sunk the time and effort 
needed to produce the innovation, others may endeavor to copy it, competing against the original 
inventor and reducing her profits.  In this way, the monetizable value of a costly innovation can 
(theoretically) be driven down to almost nothing. And, anticipating such copying, the inventor 
simply chooses not to innovate in the first instance.  By preventing copying, then, patent rights 
thereby protect innovative effort.   
Second, the innovation process itself is generally quite unpredictable, and thus—the 
argument goes—patent rights might additionally be used to confront the fact that  inventors might 
otherwise gravitate to less risky pursuits. The late Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, for example, 
 
13 Martin J. Adelman, Randall R. Rader, & Gordon P. Klanczik, PATENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL at 13 (Thomson West 
2008). 
14 Id. (describing the historical evolution and the requirements of patent law in the United States.) 
15 Peter S. Menell, Mark A. Lemley, & Robert P. Merges, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL 
AGE 2019: VOL. II COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND STATE IP PROTECTIONS (2019). 
16 See generally Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005). 
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argued that risk-aversion may lead to under-investment in invention.17  According to this theory, 
the ostensibly lucrative monopoly-like rights provided by the patent system can supply an extra 
“premium” that compensates would-be innovators for taking on this risk, motivating them to 
innovate in ways that are socially desirable.  This basic economic theory is no stranger to United 
States Supreme Court jurisprudence.  In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., a well-known case that 
discussed the purposes of intellectual property law, the Supreme Court famously remarked:  “[t]he 
patent laws . . . [offer] a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk 
the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development.”18 A central focus of this 
Article is this second aspect of the economic theory.   
 Outside of financial incentives, the IP literature also suggests other motivators of 
innovation, including reputational effects, career rewards, and a variety of intrinsic motivations.19 
For instance, some individuals derive entertainment value from solving puzzles—an activity that 
can also lead (when appropriately directed) to innovation even as it provides intrinsic satisfaction 
and motivation to the inventor.20   Similarly, employees within a firm may be motivated by 
opportunities for promotion rather than direct pecuniary benefits from patenting.21 Our analysis is 
tangentially related to these motivations as well (at least insofar as non-monetary incentives are 
similarly affected by risk aversion). 
 
 2.  Risk Preferences of Individuals and Firms with Respect to Creating.  Because risk plays 
a central role in shaping innovation markets, and because inventors may require compensation for 
taking on such risk, understanding how much compensation is required looms large for legal 
policy. As would-be innovators’ aversion to risk grows, so too grows the size of the patent bounty 
needed to motivate them. Unfortunately, there is (up to now) scant empirical or experimental 
evidence on the risk preferences of individuals and firms within the innovation ecosystem.  To the 
extent the IP literature takes the issue on, much of it appears to assume that creators, inventors, 
and investors in innovation are risk-averse pretty much to the same degree as anyone else (although 
a minority of scholars sometimes conjecture the opposite—that creators and inventors are risk-
seeking). Below we review and synthesize some of the major contributions in this area.  
Joseph Stiglitz, yet another Nobel laureate, articulates the canonical view that “[p]eople 
and firms are risk averse, and if they have to bear risk, they have to be compensated for doing 
so.”22  Under this view, potential creators and others in the innovation system suffer from risk-
aversion just like anyone else would.  Without the financial premiums promised by the patent and 
 
17 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION 
OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:  ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 620 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962) (“[t]he 
preinvention monopoly power acts as a strong disincentive to further innovation.”) 
18 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). 
19 See Saul Lach & Mark Schankerman, Incentives and Invention in Universities, 39 RAND J. OF ECON. 403, 434 
(2008). 
20 Alice Lam, What Motivates Academic Scientists to Engage in Research Commercialization: ‘Gold’, ‘Ribbon’ or 
‘Puzzle’? 40 RESEARCH POLICY 1354 (2011); Jessica Silbey, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS INNOVATORS, AND 
EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Stanford Univ. Press 2014).  
21 Matthew S. Clancy & GianCarlo Moschini, Incentives for Innovation: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 
35 APPLIED ECON. PERSPECTIVES & POLICY, 206, 217-18 (2013) (“if scientists are relatively risk-neutral or are 
talented enough that the probability of successful outcome is high, the optimal contract is tightly tied to 
performance….a scientist may choose [] to do research in a field because it is populated with scientists who can 
certify their work, which in turn sustains the supply of scientists in the field, even absent more fundamental 
justifications.”) 
22 Joseph A. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1723–24 (2008). 
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copyright systems, the argument goes, risk-averse creators will engage in sub-optimal levels of 
creative activity.  Steven Horowitz makes a similar claim about copyright, arguing that copyright 
holders are “risk averse, valuing clear entitlements more than equivalent murky ones.”23 
 Analogizing to the American mineral system for public lands, in 1977 Edmund Kitch 
propounded (what he dubbed) the “prospect theory of patents,” which conceives of patent-related 
R&D as somewhat akin to gold prospecting, and asserting that patent rights are useful in 
channeling and coordinating development activities in new technologies. 24   By awarding 
exclusivity shortly after invention, Kitch’s prospect theory asserts that the patent system provides 
the first inventor with an incentive to develop the broad field of invention.25  Other scholars note 
that prospect theory implicitly pre-supposes a risk-averse inventor who needs strong property 
rights to be incentivized to develop the field.26 
 It is important to note that not all IP commentators are convinced that creators are, on 
average, notably risk averse, and some in fact assert the opposite. F.M. Scherer, for example, 
advanced what he dubbed the “lottery theory” of patents, analogizing them to lottery tickets, with 
most patents being essentially worthless while a small minority of them having substantial value.27  
Building upon Joseph Schumpeter’s theory that investors overestimate their chances of success 
when presented with a potentially great reward, Scherer posited that potential inventors are 
sufficiently incentivized to create new inventions by the remote chance of garnering a large payoff 
from a patent.28  Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner situate (and ultimately criticize) this 
argument in broader organizational contexts, noting that “the lottery theory critically depends on 
the assumption that inventors, like lottery ticket buyers, are risk-seeking—indeed, so risk-seeking 
that they are willing to engage in an activity with a negative expected value.”29  Nevertheless, 
Parchomovsky and Wagner argue, it is firms, and not individuals, that pursue most patents, thereby 
diffusing much of the lottery-theory effect, since “the decisions of corporate managers appear both 
rational and even risk-averse.”30 
 In short, while most voices in the IP chorus appear to have coalesced around the proposition 
that that primary actors in patent settings are risk averse, it is not difficult to isolate dissonant 
voices, asserting contrary positions across the spectrum. Perpetuating this heterogeneity, perhaps, 
is the fact that there is little reliable data about how/whether risk aversion exhibits atypical traits 
within intellectual property settings; and most of what does exist out there seems frustratingly 
 
23 Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 334 (2012). 
24 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System. 20 J. OF L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1977). Kitch’s 
prospect theory is analytically distinct from Kahnemann & Tversky’s prospect theory, published 2 years later, 
regarding the predictable results of a lottery. Daniel Kahnemann & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). 
25 Id. at 266. 
26 See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State:  Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor after Eldred, 
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1329 (2004) (“[g]iven the support for risk-seeking behavior, inventors….may 
actually prefer a strong form of patent law that richly rewards successful inventors rather than a form that seeks to 
protect unsuccessful inventors who survive through imitation.”)  
27 See generally F. M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY:  INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).  
See also Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery:  Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common Good, 16 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 141, 142 (2008) ) (“[t]he majority of issued patents are relatively worthless, as the holder never 
asserts, licenses, or even leverages the asset….only a few are highly valuable.”) 
28 Supra note 19, at 1329. 
29 Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 25 (2005). 
30 Id. at 58. 
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inconclusive.31   Perhaps the most well-known study on this score was authored by Thomas 
Astebro, who examined a sample of approximately 1,000 Canadian inventions that had been 
evaluated before commercialization potential by a non-for-profit organization, the Canadian 
Innovation Centre (CIC).32  Astebro surveyed the inventors many years after the CIC evaluation 
to learn whether they had commercialized after receiving the CIC evaluation, and if so, what the 
return on investment was. 33   He reported that independent inventors tended to develop and 
commercialize even inventions that were projected to have negative expected returns.34  In other 
words, these individuals continued to invest time and money in their inventions in a manner that 
would have been better spent elsewhere. Why might this be so? Astebro concludes that “risk-
seeking is one of several plausible reasons why so many inventors proceed to develop their 
inventions while only a small fraction can reasonably expect to earn positive returns on their 
efforts.  Another plausible explanation is that inventors are unrealistic optimists in that they 
“overestimate their abilities to succeed.”35 
Risk aversion also plays an important role in understanding the incentives of those who 
license IP from others. These parties may similarly make their licensing choices, for example, in 
a manner that reflects the risk of liability for infringement.  For example, Robert Merges points to 
“risk aversion” as the reason a potential patent infringer may pay a higher rate or fee for a license 
than that which would be justified by a traditional economic analysis.36  Jeanne Fromer makes a 
similar argument, not about the royalty rate, but about entering into licenses in the first instance.  
According to Fromer, competitors take patent licenses because they are risk-averse about potential 
liability.37 
Although patent law is the central focus of this article, our arguments extend beyond it. 
Several scholars and courts, for example, consider the patent and copyright law as being closely 
intertwined.38 This is, in part, because both areas of law draw their authority from the same clause 
in the U.S. Constitution.39 But even on a more functionalist level, risk aversion appears to play a 
similar motivating role in the copyright literature. James Gibson, for example, writes that “the 
decision-makers in the real world of copyright practice are typically risk-averse”40 and that new 
copyrightable works require “high upfront investment” and only a “prospect” at profits (reflecting 
 
31 See Andres Sawicki, Risky IP, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 81, 120 (2016) (“[e]xisting empirical work provides some 
support for this [risk tolerance] hypothesis, although it is inconclusive.”)  
32 Thomas Astebro, The Return to Independent Invention:  Evidence of Unrealistic Optimism, Risk Seeking or 
Skewness Loving?, 113 ECON. J. 226 (2003). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 227. 
35 Id. at 236. 
36 Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards:  Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. 
L. REV. 803, 867 n.260 (1988). 
37 See Jeanne Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 751 (2009). 
38 See e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011) (relying upon case law from copyright 
law to interpret Section 271(b) of the Patent Act regarding inducing infringement); Sony Corporation of America v. 
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (noting that Congress used language from the Patent Act to draft 
provisions in the Copyright Act). See e.g., J.H. Reichman. Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright 
Dichotomoy: Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENTERTAINMENT 475 (1984). 
39 U.S. Constitution, Section VIII, Clause 8. (“the United States Congress shall have power…To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”) 
40 James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 891 (2007). 
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the risk of creation failure).41  But Gibson also ties the risk-aversion to liability for infringement, 
saying that decision makers “approach legal issues very conservatively, particularly issues like 
copyright liability, which have the potential to delay or even destroy the entire project.”42  Fromer 
also posits that fear of copyright liability causes particular problems because authors are risk-
averse.  She opines that “risk-averse authors might frequently avoid modifying works in ways that 
ought to be construed as fair uses or secure an unnecessary license authorizing this modification.”43 
 On the other hand, Andres Sawicki nicely explains the state of the research into risk 
tolerances relating to copyright (and intellectual property more broadly).  While noting the 
empirical evidence is often inconclusive and scant, Sawicki hypothesizes that creators have a 
greater tolerance for risk than the general population.44 The reasoning is that creative individuals 
prefer riskier environments because such environments open up more avenues for creativity than 
less risky ones.45  Sawicki further speculates that the risk preferences of creators might affect 
which form of incentive—IP rights, prizes, grants, and tax credits—would be societally optimal.46  
But in the end, all of this is conjecture:  As Sawicki himself emphasizes, there appears to be little 
empirical evidence one way or another.47 
Backing up a layer, what do we know about the risk tolerances of the firms organizing and 
underwriting IP? Here, available data is similarly scant and somewhat open to interpretation; but 
a few observations warrant observation. As is well known, the venture capital (VC) investment 
model is one that dominates innovation markets, with portfolio-company entrepreneurs and VC 
investors contracting over investments designed to propel the startup into onto the right trajectory 
for a lucrative exit event (such as initial public offering or acquisition).48  It is also well known 
that this trajectory is fraught with risk: a familiar statistic in the tech industry is that nine out of ten 
VC-backed startups fail.49  Moreover, neither employees nor VC investors are easily able to 
 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Jeanne Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1820 (2012). 
44 See Sawicki, supra note 23, at 81. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 88. 
47 Id. at 85.  One article is tangential to our experiment.  Hans Hvide and Georgios Panos used stock market 
investment participation by Norwegan investors as a proxy for risk tolerance, and then showed that individuals with 
higher manifest risk tolerance are more likely to become entrepreneurs.  Hans K. Hvide & Georgios A. Panos, Risk 
Tolerance and Entrepreneurship, 111 J. OF FIN. ECON. 200 (2014).  Their identification strategy hinges on 
consistency of preferences over time and across contexts.  See id. at 203 (“An implicit assumption from Eqs. (1) and 
(2) is that the risk preference parameter r is stable over time and across decision problems.  This assumption is 
debatable”).  Our study, in contrast, demonstrates that risk preferences may not be consistent over time / across 
context.  And, we don't really test entrepreneurship itself, but rather willingness to invest in risky entrepreneurial 
projects more heavily in one's stock market portfolio choices. 
48 Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 164 (2019); see also Brian Kingsley Krumm, 
Fostering Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Shark Tank Shouldn’t be the Model, 70 ARK. L. REV. 553, 561-70 
(2017) (describing the history and model of venture capitalist investment). 
49 This statistic is quite pervasive throughout the tech industry. See, e.g., Erin Griffith, Why Startups Fail, According 
to Their Founders, FORTUNE (Sept. 25, 2014), https://fortune.com/2014/09/25/why-startups-fail-according-to-their-
founders/; Neil Patel, 90% of Startups Fail: Here’s What You Need to Know About the 10%, FORBES (Jan. 16, 
2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/neilpatel/2015/01/16/90-of-startups-will-fail-heres-what-you-need-to-know-
about-the-10/. However, studies have suggested that while venture capitalist startups tend to have high failure rates, 
those rates likely do not reach ninety percent. See, e.g., Yael V. Hochberg, Alexander Ljungqvist & Yang Lu, Whom 
You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance, 62 J. Fin. 251, 263 (2007) (finding that 
companies who received their first institutional funding round between 1980 and 1999 failed about one-third of the 
time); Deborah Gage, The Venture Capitalist Secret: 3 Out of 4 Start-Ups Fail, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2012), 
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diversify away their economic risks: human capital investments are generically undiversifiable by 
definition, and venture capital funds must still concentrate their investments on a handful of illiquid 
equity positions.50 
On first blush, an industry with a significant amount of undiversifiable risk would appear 
to be an unattractive target for risk-averse entrepreneurs and financiers. (Or at the very least, one 
might expect financial market participants to demand substantial risk premia to tie up their capital 
in such illiquid purgatories.) And yet, the venture capital industry has been vibrant for over three 
decades and continues to thrive, particularly in the innovation industries.51 It is difficult to explain 
the explosiveness of this sector in the presence of significant individual risk aversion among its 
principal participants. And indeed, while VC investors tend to earn attractive returns (a possible 
marker of market risk aversion), several commentators have noted that the return premiums for 
VC investors appear comparatively modest when compared to equivalently risky investments 
(particularly in the last decade);52 this phenomenon appears to hold true even though many of the 
same actors also routinely exhibit more conventional (risk averse) tendencies in their other 
investment activities.53  
 The confluence of a vibrant VC market and generally risk averse investors is easier to 
understand if risk tolerances interacted meaningfully with the domain of innovation: For example, 
if investors had less of a “distaste” for risk in innovation-related settings, then an investor in such 
an industry would not demand similarly significant compensation for risk-bearing as she would in 
an otherwise equivalent setting outside innovation industries. As such, it would make the longevity 
of the VC-backed industries much more understandable, as well as the seemingly inconsistent 
behavior of individual investors across segments – willing to gamble in innovation industries but 
shunning risk elsewhere.54 
 
 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000872396390443720204578004980476429190 (finding that 75% of companies 
receiving venture funding failed from 2004 to 2010). 
50 For example, Professor Gompers and Professor Lerner observed that VC funds typically invest in at most two 
dozen firms over about three years. Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, An Analysis of Compensation in the U.S. Venture 
Capital Partnership, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 6 (1999). 
51  The private capital database Pitchbook, for example, documents that the total number of VC deals in innovative 
industries within the US have more than tripled during the past few years, from 1,969 deals in 2010 to its peak of 
7,126 deals in 2015, with the number remaining relatively constant afterward. Moreover, total capital invested has 
been on a constant rise, reaching its peak in 2018 with $96.76 billion in capital raised. In 2019 there were $82.36 
billion raised, a sevenfold increase from 2010 with $110.6 billion. See www.pitchbook.com.  
52 See, e.g., Raphael Amit et. al., Entrepreneurial Ability, Venture Investments, and Risk Sharing, 36 MGMT. SCI. 
1232 (1990) (developing a theoretical model that shows risk-averse entrepreneurs with differential ability will want 
to have VC investors who are risk neutral); Michael Ewens et al., The Price of Diversifiable Risk in Venture Capital 
and Private Equity, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 1853, 1856-57 (2013) (reviewing the literature that shows that the large 
IRRs demanded by VC funds are not compensating for risk, but rather are pure excess return driven by agency cost 
considerations). 
53 Ben Walther, The Peril and Promise of Preferred Stock, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 161, 204 (“Holders of preferred stock 
are also naturally risk-averse, since they participate in losses but not in gains; they can be expected to be unhappy 
with the board if it takes risks.”); see also Brendan Coffey, Venture Capitalists Become Risk Averse, FORTUNE (Oct. 
20, 2011), https://fortune.com/2011/10/20/venture-capitalists-become-risk-averse/; cf. Steven N. Kaplan & Per 
Strömberg, Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses, 59 J. FIN. 2177 
(2004) (assessing the effect of internal and external risks on venture capitalist decision-making).  
54 Cf.  Ewens et al. The Price of Diversifiable Risk in Venture Capital and Private Equity, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 1853, 
1883-84 (2013) (describing the “idiosyncratic risk” resulting from “unavoidable principal-agent problems . . . 
combined with the need for investment oversight). 
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 3.  Prior Related Experiments on Intellectual Property. Having covered a brief overview 
of the conceptual literature related to innovation markets and risk aversion, here we touch briefly 
on the growing amount of experimental work in the IP field. There is some prior work here 
complementary to our enterprise, but none of it appears to be right on point.55  Perhaps the closest 
exploration to our own was conducted by Christopher Buccafusco and Christopher Sprigman, who 
ran a series of experiments designed to test for the existence and size of the “endowment effect” 
in intellectual property rights. 56   The endowment effect is a well-known (and oft-debated) 
phenomenon in behavioral psychology, asserting that people tend to value rights (or initial 
“endowments”) more when they already own them, as opposed to when they would have to pay to 
acquire such rights. For example, a person would tend demand more to sell a property right (or 
other legal right) that she already owns than she would be willing to pay for the identical property 
right (or other legal right) out of a stock of cash (or other liquid asset). Exactly why people’s 
valuations depend on initial endowments is not entirely clear. Gregory Klass and Kathryn Zeiler57 
explain endowment effects as a corollary to “loss aversion,” – the idea that losses cause more pain 
than gains cause pleasure.58 The existence of endowment effects is somewhat controversial with a 
few economists,59 but many experiments, including those of Buccafusco and Sprigman, find that 
they are real and extend to IP markets.60 Specifically, Buccafusco and Sprigman find that the 
endowment effect is large for the rights to a prize for a winning poem or painting.61  However, 
these insights—while interesting and important in their own right—are somewhat tangential to our 
 
55 Foremost are several prior experimental papers on IP law, many of them by Christopher Buccafusco, Christopher 
Sprigman and various coauthors.  See, e.g., infra notes 39, 42, 43, 45.  These experiments are aimed at figuring out 
how people respond creatively to various types of incentives, and how they value and trade the IP once it is created.   
56 See generally Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property:  An Experiment, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010) (“no study has explored the existence of the endowment effect for property that, like 
IP, (1) was actually created by the owners and (2) is nonrival….in this article we present an experiment that 
demonstrates a substantial valuation asymmetry….[t]he observed differences in valuation indicate that IP licensing 
markets may be substantially less efficient than previously believed.”); Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher 
Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (2011) (“we report on….a planned series of experiments 
designed to determine whether transactions in intellectual property (IP) are subject to the valuation anomaly 
commonly referred to as the ‘endowment effect’ – the empirical finding that owners of goods tend to value them 
substantially more than do purchasers.”) 
57 Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship, 
61 UCLA L. REV. 2 (2013). 
58 Id. at page 4. But other psychological explanations might be possible. Thus, one might gain some sentimental 
attachment to objects, particularly intimate objects such as wedding rings, clothing, and jewelry, from owning them. 
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 32 STAN. L. REV 957, 959  (1982). 
59 Klass & Zeiler, supra note 57; Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay-Willingness to Accept 
Gap, the "Endowment Effect," Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 
AM. ECON. REV. 530 (2005)(suggesting that experimental subjects’ misconceptions are responsible for the 
endowment effect.); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer, Willingness-To_Pay vs. Willingness-To-Access: Legal 
and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993); Jennifer Arlen, Matthew L. Spitzer & Eric L. Talley, 
Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002); Jason F. Shogren, Seung 
Y. Shin, Dermot J. Hayes, & James B. Kliebenstein, Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to 
Accept, 84 AMER. ECON. REV. 255 (1994).  
60 See generally Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property:  An Experiment, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010) (creating an experimental market for poems modeled after a market for licensing IP 
and finding a substantial valuation asymmetry between authors of poems and potential purchasers of them); 
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (2011) (showing that 
painters value their paintings more than four times higher than potential buyers of the paintings did and almost twice 
as high as did legal owners of the paintings.)  
61 Id. at 30. 
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inquiry here.  First, they test for bids and offers for a prize in a copyright context, not the decision 
to invest in an invention.  Second, their endowment effect frame is fundamentally different from 
(and independent of) our risk tolerance frame.62   
 There are a number of other important experimental recent works on IP.  For example, 
Buccafusco, Burns, Fromer and Sprigman test the different incentives provided by copyright and 
patent on creativity.63  They have subjects play a game, randomly assigning the scoring rubrics. 
Buccafusco et al argue that the different scoring rubrics are proxies for the creativity thresholds in 
patent and copyright, with patent having a higher bar to score any points, and copyright with a low 
bar. Unlike our study, their experiment does not address risk preferences of inventors or investors. 
Several prior works have focused on sequential innovation—the problem of needing to get 
permission to use prior, protected works in creating new works.  The first was an extremely 
complicated, multiple stage game.64  Some subsequent experiments have been less complex and 
suggest that IP rights in a first invention hinder sequential innovation.65  Others suggest that a lack 
of rights in a first invention, as against sequential invention, discourages the initial invention.66 
Sequential innovation is an interesting yet distinct question from the research questions we tackle 
in this article. 
 In sum, although there are several interesting scholarly contributions at the intersection of 
IP and experimental methods, it appears that none of them directly addresses the issues we attempt 
to take on in this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
62 See discussion infra Section B. In addition, they do not test for the difference between laboratory experiments and 
M-Turk.  There is at least one prior work using M-Turk for an IP experiment by Buccafusco, Paul Heald, and Wen 
Bu. See generally Christopher Buccafusco, Paul J. Heald & Wen Bu, Testing Tarnishment in Trademark and 
Copyright Law:  The Effect of Pornographic Versions of Protected Marks and Works, 94 WASH. U.L. REV. 341 
(2016) ) (“[t]his article presents two novel experimental tests of the tarnishment hypotheses….our results find little 
evidence supporting the tarnishment hypothesis.”)  However, we have found no prior work testing for the difference 
between a brick-and-mortar laboratory and M-Turk in any IP experiment. 
63 Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. & Christopher J. Sprigman, Experimental Tests of Intellectual 
Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2014).  These legal rules can be quite idiosyncratic.  For 
a superb experimental test of the fairness of the German “Bestseller Paragraph” provision in copyright, and its effect 
on the market, see Christoph Engel & Michael J. Kurschilgen, Fairness Ex Ante and Ex Post – An Experimental Test 
of the German ‘Bestseller Paragraph’, 8 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 682 (2011). 
64 See generally Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 130, 130 (2009) (“This article presents empirical data generated using PatentSim, - a simulation game 
designed specifically to test hypotheses about patent systems, commons systems, and technological innovation.”). 
65 See generally Stefan Bechtold, Christopher Buccafusco, Christopher J. Sprigman, Innovation Heuristics:  
Experiments on Sequential Creativity in Intellectual Property, 91 IND. L. J. 1251 (2016) (“We find that subjects are 
only mildly responsive to external inventives….choices between innovation and borrowing correlated much more 
powerfully with their internal, subjective beliefs about the difficulty of innovating.”).; Julia Bruggemann, Paolo 
Crosetto, Lukas Meub & Kilian Bizer, Intellectual Property Rights Hinder Sequential Innovation.  Experimental 
Evidence, 45 RES. POL’Y 2054 (2016) (“Our results suggest that granting intellectual property rights hinders 
innovations, especially for sectors characterized by a strong sequentiality in innovation process.”). Note however, 
that Bechtold, et. al., obtain results partially inconsistent with inventor rationality. 
66 See, e.g., Kevin J. Boudreau & Karim R. Lakhani, How Disclosure Policies Impact Search in Open Innovation 
(Harv. Bus. Sch. Tech. & Operations Mgmt., Working Paper 2013) (“We find intermediate disclosure has the 
advantage of efficiently steering development towards improving existing solution approaches, but also the effect of 
limiting experimentation and narrowing technological search.”).  
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B. Framing Effects 
 
 The core focus of our study pertains to whether risk tolerances appear to interact 
responsively to contexts “framed” by innovative activity. Consequently, our arguments intersect 
in meaningful ways with the (so-called) framing literatures that permeate much of psychology, 
political science and economics. Within these literatures, as it turns out, the term frame can be 
used in several different ways. Thus, in order to identify and situate our contribution, we briefly 
review below several competing conceptions of the term, identifying where our analysis fits in. 
(Readers who are already knowledgeable about the taxonomy of “framing effects” in economics, 
psychology, political science, and sociology literatures may go directly to part 4 in this subsection, 
which identifies the particular type we utilize in our experiments.) 
 
 1.  Categorization Schemes.  —  Framing categorization schemes in the political science 
and psychology literatures are reasonably well established.  For example, James Druckman 
contrasts equivalence framing—“the use of different, but logically equivalent, words or phrases 
(e.g., 5% unemployment versus 95% employment; 97% fat-free versus 3% fat) causes individuals 
to alter their preferences” —with emphasis framing effects, which “lead the subject to focus on 
one aspect of a problem, thereby affecting her opinions and preferences.”67  Priyodorshi Banerjee 
and Sujoy Chakravarty, on the other hand, contrast label framing, invoked “if subjects are 
confronted with alternative wordings, but objectively equivalent material incentives and 
unchanged reference points (with regard to how the endowment is initially allocated),” with value 
framing, where “subjects are confronted with alternative wordings and objectively equivalent 
material incentives but changed reference points.”68  Irwin Levin, Sandra Schneider and Gary 
Gaeth contrast risky choice framing (similar to value framing) with attribute framing, where 
“people are more likely to evaluate a gamble favorably when it is described positively in terms of 
winning rather than when it is described negatively in terms of losing,” and goal framing, in which, 
not surprisingly, “the goal of an action or behavior is” described differently.69 None of these 
categorizations is directly analogous to our inquiry here. 
 
2.  Light Computation.  —  In other literatures, framing tends to place subjects in a situation 
that requires light computation so as to understand that the choices they confront.  These framing 
studies include the “reference point” studies for which Kahneman and Tversky are most famous.70  
This category also includes circumstances where frames induce asymmetric errors in 
understanding games.71  There are additionally experiments that use compound lotteries.  For 
example, Mohammed Abdellaoui, Peter Kilbanoff, and Laetitia Placido measured compound risk 
and found that subjects valued compound risks differently than simple risks and that the risk 
attitudes displayed “more [risk] aversion as the reduced probability of the winning event 
 
67 James N. Druckman, The Implications of Framing Effects For Citizen Competence, 23 POL. BEHAV. 225, 228  
(2001). 
68 Priyodorshi Banerjee & Sujoy Chakravarty, The Effect of Minimal Group Framing in a Dictator Game 
Experiment, SSRN, 5 (May 31, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2071006. 
69 Irwin P. Levin, Sandra L. Schneider & Gary J. Gaeth, All Frames Not Created Equal:  A Typology and Critical 
Analysis of Framing Effects, 76 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 149, 159-60 (1998). 
70 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 3. 
71 See Toke Reinholt Fosgaard, Lars Garn Hansen & Erik Wengstrom, Framing and Misperception in Public Good 
Experiments. 119 SCAND. J. OF ECON. 435 (2016). 
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increases.”72  Also worthy of note here is a fascinating recent paper by Richard Brooks, Alexander 
Stremitzer and Stephan Tontrup, which studies the effort participants exerted when they entered 
into a contract and completed economic tests for compensation.73  The authors determined that 
thresholds and framing affect effort, noting particularly that loss framing with “poorly selected 
thresholds may reduce effort”.74  These versions of light computation frames have features that are 
shared with the type of frame we study here. 
 
 3.  Emphasis and Priming.  —  There are also frames that tend to emphasize some aspect 
of a given choice, casting one (or more) option in a negative / positive light.  An excellent example 
comes from Dennis Chong and Druckman:  
 
What is particularly vexing in public opinion research is a phenomenon known as 
“framing effects.”  These occur when (often small) changes in the presentation of 
an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion.  For example, 
when asked whether they would favor or oppose allowing a hate group to hold a 
political rally, 85% of respondents answered in favor if the question was prefaced 
with the suggestion, “Given the importance of free speech,” whereas only 45% 
were in favor when the question was prefaced with the phrase, “Given the risk of 
violence.”75 
 
 In this sort of frame, there is no real difficulty or mental computation required in 
understanding the basic choice of allowing a hate group to hold a rally or not.  The frame, instead, 
prompts the subject to concentrate on either a positive aspect (the value of free speech) or a 
negative aspect (the risk of violence) inherent in the choice.  Emphasis frames seem very close to 
priming in psychology—an approach that gives subjects some information that triggers a particular 
emotional reaction, or which focuses attention on some aspect of the experiment.76  Thus, a recent 
article “primes” experimental subjects (all of whom were financial professionals) with either a 
boom or a bust scenario.77  Those who were primed with a bust scenario became more risk averse.78  
 
72 Mohammed Abdellaoui, Peter Klibanoff & Laetitia Placido, Experiments on Compound Risk in Relation to Simple 
Risk and to Ambiguity, 61 MGMT. SCI. 1306,  (2015). 
73 Richard R. W. Brooks, Alexander Stremitzer & Stephan Tontrup, Stretch It but Don’t Break It:  The Hidden Cost 
of Contract Framing, 46 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 399 (2017). 
74 Id. at 1. 
75 Dennis Chong & James M. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 103, 104 (2007). 
76 John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Mind in the Middle: A Practical Guide to Priming and Automaticity 
Research, HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 253 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2000) (providing a guide to various priming methods used across psychological fields); van Schie & van der 
Pligt, Influencing Risk Preference in Decision Making: The Effects of Framing and Salience, 63 ORG. BEHAVIOR 
AND HUM DECISION PROCESSES 264 (1995) (discussing the relevance of salience, which may be produced by 
priming).  
77 Alain Cohn, Jan Engelmann, Ernst Fehr, and Michel André Maréchal,. Evidence for Countercyclical Risk 
Aversion: An Experiment with Financial Professionals, 105 AMER. ECON. REV. 860 (2015); Jae-Hyoung Kim & 
Elizabeth Hoffman, Contrast Effects in Investment and Financing Decisions”  (working paper, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3256087) (finding that contrast effects altered investment 
decisions, but not financing decisions, and hypothesizing that the fact that subjects took significantly more time 
making financing decisions than investment decisions suggests that financing decisions required  more careful 
thought and triggered “slow” thinking, as described by Daniel Kahneman in Thinking Fast and Slow,  Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux, 2011). 
78 Id. at 860. 
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But one could just as easily say that the subjects were in a bust frame, where the frame is an 
emphasis frame. 79   Priming, rather than framing, tends to be used in experiments involving 
financial decision making and risk acceptance.80  Again, this approach does not seem to square 
with the frame in our paper. 
 
 4.  Imagine Yourself in a Context.  —  Finally, “Imagine Yourself in a Context” frames can 
be found in experiments that either tell subjects that they are in a particular setting, or ask the 
subjects to imagine themselves in a particular setting when making choices.  These experiments 
often involve risky choices, particularly those experiments looking for the source of differences 
between men’s and women’s attitudes towards risk.81  In these frames, the subjects are prompted 
to imagine themselves in a casino, or imagine themselves buying insurance, or imagine themselves 
making an investment.  In some of these papers the context, interacted with gender, produces a 
change in risk aversion.82  The exact mechanism is unclear.  It could be that subjects have different 
utility functions in different contexts, or perceive probabilities differently in different contexts (e.g. 
 
79 Similarly, Ellingsen found that situational labels significantly affect behavior, they framed a prisoner’s dilemma 
as “community game” or a “stock market game” they found that subjects were more cooperative when framed as a 
“community  game.”  Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson, Johanna Mollerstrom, and Sara Munkhammar, Social 
framing effects: Preferences or Beliefs?, 76 GAMES AND ECON. BEHAVIOR 117 (2012). Further, Tyran found that 
expectations of cooperation amongst others lead to an increase in cooperation with non-deterrent sanction laws.  
Jean-Robert Tyran & Lars P. Feld, Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non-deterrent,108 SCAND. J. OF 
ECON. 135 (2006). 
80 See, e.g., Hans-Peter Erb, Antoine Bioy, and Denis J. Hilton, Choice Preferences Without Inferences: 
Subconscious Priming of Risk Attitudes, 15 J. OF BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 251 (2002); Gregory N. Mandel, 
To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1999 (2011); Meier-Pesti and Penz, 2008.  For a highly imaginative connection of priming and memory, see 
Petko Kusev et al. Preferences Induced by Accessibility: Evidence From Priming, 5 J. OF NEUROSCIENCE, 
PSYCHOLOGY, AND ECON. 250 (2012). 
81 See, e.g., Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, Forecasting Risk Attitudes:  An Experimental Study Using 
Actual and Forecast Gamble Choices, 68 J. OF ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 1 (2008) (“We find that women are 
significantly more risk averse than men….and predictions of both women and men tend to confirm this difference.);  
Renate Schubert, Martin Brown, Matthias Gysler and Hans Wolfgang Brachinger, Financial Decision-Making: Are 
Women Really More Risk-Averse?, 89 AMER. ECON. REV., PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH ANNUAL 
MEETING OF THE AMERICAN ECON. ASS’N 381, 383-84 (May 1999); Helga Fehr-Duda, Manuele de Gennaro, and 
Schubert, Renate,  Gender, Financial Risk, and Probability Weights. 60 THEORY AND DECISION 283 304-5 (2006); 
Sebastian Lotz, Is Women’s Behavior More Context-Dependent than Men’s? Gender Differences in Reluctant 
Altruism (2015) (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2540050); Gary Charness & Uri Gneezy, Strong 
Evidence for Gender Differences in Risk Taking, 83 J. OF ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 50, 54 (2012). 
82 The study conducted by Schubert, et. al., found that “female subjects do not generally make less risky financial 
choices” than men.  Supra note 85 , at 384.  However, the female subjects were more risk averse in abstract 
gambling situations.  Id. at 384.  Additionally, Lotz found “considerable gender differences between women and 
men that depended on the context of the game.”  Supra note 85 , at 4. When the game demanded more giving, 
women displayed more generosity, while the “men’s behavior is not context-dependent.”  Id. at 1. Croson et al. 
observed differences in risk, social and competitive preferences; they noted that emotions, overconfidence and 
framing could be the cause behind sex differences. Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, Gender Differences in 
Preferences,47 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE, 448, 452-54 (2009) . Additionally, Charness and Gneezy directly found 
that women are less likely to invest.  Supra note 85 , at 70. When Eckel and Grossman conducted research in 
gambling games with three framings, they found that women were more risk averse even with an investment frame 
with no losses.  Supra note 85 , at 1. In contrast, Nelson (2015) reviewed 35 empirical works that studied sex-based 
risk aversion, she determined that in many cases the difference between men and women lacked statistical 
significance. Julie A. Nelson, Are Women Really More Risk-Averse Than Men? A Re-Analysis of the Literature 
Using Expanded Methods, 29 J. OF ECON. SURVEYS 566, 604.  (2015). 
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casino v. insurance) or it could be that the frames prime different emotions that in turn change 
behavior.83  This context is, in essence, the nature of the frame we employ below. 
 
 
 
II. DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIMENT 
 
 Having reviewed the general literature on intellectual property, risk tolerance and framing 
effects, we are now in a position to explain the details of our experimental design.  
 
1. Experimental 2x2 Design—As noted in the introduction, the central question we explore in this 
article is whether people manifest different risk tolerances when an otherwise risky choice is 
framed in terms of an innovation-related investment. Thus, a key feature of our experiment is to 
confront subjects with a choice between (1) a safe choice and (2) a risky choice; and then to 
manipulate that choices to be framed in (i) an innovation-framed context or (ii) a non-framed 
context. Our baseline experiments, then—as well as our robustness tests—navigate variants of the 
basic design illustrated in Table 1: 
 
 (1) Safe Choice (2) Risky Choice 
(i) Innovation-Related Frame I II 
(ii) No Frame III IV 
 
Table 1: 2x2 Setup for Experimental Design 
 
 
Consider first the choice presented to subjects in the innovation-related frame (cells I and II in the 
top row of  Table 1, which we refer to in what follows as our “Invest in Invention” treatment 
group). Subjects in this frame were given the following prompt: 
 
Before filling out a brief questionnaire, you will be given $8 either to Keep or to 
Invest in creating a hypothetical invention . . . .  If you choose to Keep, your 
earnings will be $8.  If you choose to Invest there is a 1/3 chance that the creative 
and commercialization process will be successful and return $30, and a 2/3 chance 
that it will be unsuccessful in the market and return $3.  A role of a die will 
determine your earnings, either $30 or $3. 
 
Now consider the choice presented to subjects in the non-innovation frame (cells III and IV in the 
bottom row of Table 1, or the “Simple Lottery” control group). Subjects in this frame were given 
the following prompt: 
 
 
83 Emotions like fear can alter risk decisions;  Lee and Andrade studied the effect fear plays on risk taking. Chan J. 
Lee & Eduardo B. Andrade, 2015. Fear, Excitement, and Financial Risk-Taking, 29 COGNITION AND EMOTION, 178 
(2015).  They induced fear by having subjects watch two horror movie clips, and observed that fear-induced subjects 
were more risk averse when the risk was framed as a stock market game.  Id. However, they found that risk taking 
increased when framed as an “exciting casino game.”  Id.  
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Before filling out a brief questionnaire, you will be asked to make a choice between 
Option A and Option B. You will have only a single opportunity to choose.  After 
you have made your choice, if you chose Option A, your earnings will be $8.  If 
you chose Option B, there is a 1/3 chance that your earnings will be $30, and a 2/3 
chance that your earnings will be $3.  A role of a die will determine your earnings, 
either $30 or $3. 
 
Note that the “Simple Lottery” frame and the “Invest in Invention” frame describe identical 
actuarial choices. The key difference is the way the choice is framed.84 
 In passing, it is worth observing that the setup above is closest to the “Imagine Yourself in 
a Context” version of framing discussed above, albeit with real economic stakes.  In the “Invest in 
Invention” frame, we inform subjects that they have the opportunity to invest in a “hypothetical 
invention.”  The payoffs correspond to whether or not the invention succeeds and is a success in 
the market.  Beyond the (accurate) financial rewards, clearly none of this is literally true.  Rather, 
by being prompted that this is a hypothetical invention, the subjects are being asked to imagine 
that it is true, and act accordingly (incentivized by monetary rewards).  We used the adjective 
“hypothetical” to describe the invention to reduce the chance that subjects felt that the invention 
was exciting or prosocial.  We believe that labeling it as a hypothetical invention should moderate 
the effect of the word “invention” on subjects, likely rendering conservative estimates of the true 
effects of “invention.” (Our frame is also tangentially related to a light computation frame, similar 
to the reference point frame used by Kahneman and Tversky.85  Significantly, the two choices are 
stated in absolutely identical terms.  And, just as in the other papers that use this frame, we assume 
that the subjects are imagining in precisely the way that we ask of them. ) 
 Notice also that the experiment uses a simple, binary choice between a safe and risky 
choice. We chose this design deliberately, for two reasons.  First, anticipating that we would be 
running our experiment on M-Turk, and knowing that M-Turk subjects present a far different 
profile from brick-and-mortar subjects in the lab,86 we wanted to keep the choice simple and 
intuitive.87  Second, we used the simple, binary choice because it captures some of the features of 
 
84 The attentive reader will notice that the “Invest in Innovation” frame initially endows the subject with cash and 
asks whether (s)he wants to invest it in the risky option, while the “Simple Lottery” setup does not endow the 
subject with anything and asks her to choose between safe and risky options. Consequently, one might be concerned 
that this phrasing inadvertently introduces a type of “endowment effect” in the innovation frame. We address this 
issue below, at Section IV.A.2 infra. But to cut to the chase, it does not appear that this concern has much of an 
impact on our results. First, there are a priori reasons to doubt the endowment effect plays much of a role in this 
context, since is known to dissipate when the initial “endowment” consists of cash or liquid assets (as does ours). 
But even if our innovation frame introduced an endowment effect, we would predict it would cut in the direction of 
making our subjects in that frame overly reluctant to part with their safe endowment for the risky choice. (As we 
show below, the strong tendency of our subjects is to do the opposite). But in any event, below we explore a 
variation on our experiment where the treatment retains the endowment feature but strips out all investment and 
innovation framing. There, our measured effect largely disappears. See discussion at Section IV.A.1, infra. 
85 See supra note 3. 
86 See Gabriele Paolacci & Jesse Chandler, Inside the Turk:  Understanding Mechanical Turk as a Participant Pool, 
23 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 184, 185. (2014) (finding that M-Turkers averaged 35 years of age, 
while lab subjects averaged just over 20 years of age). 
87 See Chetan Dave, Catherine Eckel, Cathleen Johnson & Christian Rojas, Eliciting Risk Preferences:  When is 
Simple Better?, 41 J. OF RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219 (2010) (“We analyze how and when a simpler, but coarser, 
elicitation method may be preferred to the more complex, but finer, one….the simpler task may be preferred for 
subjects exhibit low numeracy, as it generates less noisy behavior but similar predictive accuracy.”). An alternative 
would have been to use something like the choice in used by Gneezy and Potters.  Uri Gneezy & Jan Potters, 
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the external world in ways that more complex and nuanced choices do not.  When someone is 
asking herself, “should I invest this money or keep it?”, she is far more likely to approach this 
question as binary, at least as a first step.  And there are many situations, possibly as a result of 
mental accounting,88 where binary choices seem pervasive.  None of this is to say that a more 
complex, continuous-choice approach is not also relevant to understanding behavior.  If one were 
trying to model someone who is deciding on a large number of investments as a portfolio, a 
different approach would be needed.89 
 
2. Demographic Variables and Baseline Risk Aversion: In addition to making the choices 
described above, each subject additionally answered a series of demographic questions (related to 
age, gender, education, and the like) as well as a well-known risk aversion scale90 that delivers a 
quantitative reflection of risk aversion for each subject.91 
 The risk aversion diagnostic we employ is often known in the economics literature as the 
Holt-Laury (or HL) measure, and it warrants a bit of explanation. The HL measure for risk aversion 
asks a subject to make a choice – Option A or Option B – for each succeeding row of Table 3. The 
interpretation of the Table92 is perhaps best understood by starting at bottom row (Row 10). 
Neither Option A nor Option B has any risk whatsoever. Option A gives the subject $2.00 with 
certainty, while Option B gives the subject $3.85 with certainty. Any subject who prefers more 
money to less – a fundamental assumption about subjects in economics experiments – should 
choose Option B. (And nearly all of our subjects do the same.) 
 
An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods, 112 Q.J. OF ECON. 631, 634 (1997) (implementing the 
following choice:  Each subject was given 200 units (convertible to cash at the end of the experiment), and 
then offered the choice to allocate X, where 0 ≤ X ≤ 200, to the following  gamble.  The subject has a 2/3 
chance of losing the amount of her “bet,” X, and a 1/3 chance of winning 2.5 times X.  If the subject allocates 
less than 200 to the gamble, she gets 200 – X with certainty, plus the outcome of the gamble.).  For highly 
numerate subjects, such an approach might provide more fine-grained information on attitudes towards risk.  
However, this choice is sort of complicated, and with our M-Turk subjects, we feared generating a great deal 
of noise. 
88 See generally Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. OF BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 183 (1999) 
(“Mental accounting is the set of cognitive operations used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and 
keep track of financial activities.”); Thomas Langer & Martin Weber, Prospect Theory, Mental Accounting, and 
Differences in Aggregated and Segregated Evaluation of Lottery Portfolios, 47 Mgmt. Sci. 716 (2001) (“Mental 
accounting is the set of cognitive operations used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep 
track of financial activities.”).  
89 Jae Hyoung Kim and Elizabeth Hoffman examine the effect that prior good or bad news have on portfolio 
choices.  Jae Hyoung Kim & Elizabeth Hoffman, Contrast Effects in Investment and Financing Decisions, SSRN 
(Oct. 19, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3256087. 
90 Supra note 2.  We could have used the simpler Eckel and Grossman risk aversion test. Supra note 61.  However, as 
Eckel and Grossman said themselves of Holt and Laury, “This mechanism imposes a finer grid on the subjects’ 
decisions, and thus produces a more refined estimate of the relevant utility function parameters.  However, this comes 
at a cost of increased complexity, which may lead to errors.“  Id. at 2.  Others add:  “[t]he prevalent use of the Holt–
Laury measure has allowed researchers to compare risk attitudes across a wide array of contexts and environments.  
In turn, this has facilitated a less fragmented approach to the study of risk preferences that minimizes methodological 
differences and aims to characterize a more general phenomenon.”  Gary Charness, et. al., Experimental Methods:  
Eliciting Risk Preference, 87 J. OF ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 43, 46 (2013).  Since we wanted to estimate a risk aversion 
parameter, we made the decision to use Holt and Laury, despite the increased complexity. 
91 For a summary of the literature on estimating risk aversion prior to 2008, see James C. Cox & Glenn W. Harrison, 
Risk Aversion in Experiments, 12 Research in Experimental Economics (2008). 
92 The discussion provided in the text simplifies a bit, but it should give the reader enough detail to understand what 
is being done. For the full treatment see Appendix A. 
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  Option A (Low Variation) Option B (High Variation) 
Row 1 10% chance of $2.00 and 90% chance of $1.60 10% chance of $3.85 and 90% chance of $0.10 
Row 2 20% chance of $2.00 and 80% chance of $1.60 20% chance of $3.85 and 80% chance of $0.10 
Row 3 30% chance of $2.00 and 70% chance of $1.60 30% chance of $3.85 and 70% chance of $0.10 
Row 4 40% chance of $2.00 and 60% chance of $1.60 40% chance of $3.85 and 60% chance of $0.10 
Row 5 50% chance of $2.00 and 50% chance of $1.60 50% chance of $3.85 and 50% chance of $0.10 
Row 6 60% chance of $2.00 and 40% chance of $1.60 60% chance of $3.85 and 40% chance of $0.10 
Row 7 70% chance of $2.00 and 30% chance of $1.60 70% chance of $3.85 and 30% chance of $0.10 
Row 8 80% chance of $2.00 and 20% chance of $1.60 80% chance of $3.85 and 20% chance of $0.10 
Row 9 90% chance of $2.00 and 10% chance of $1.60 90% chance of $3.85 and 10% chance of $0.10 
Row 10 100% chance of $2.00 and 0% chance of $1.60 100% chance of $3.85 and 0% chance of $0.10 
 
Table 2: Holt-Laury Risk Aversion Index 
 
 
Now consider the options provided in Row 9. By choosing Option A the subject has a 
90% chance of getting $2.00 and only a 10% chance of getting $1.60, with an expected value of 
$1.96 (= 0.90 × ($2.00) + 0.10 × ($1.60)). Option B, on the other hand, gives the subject a 
90% chance at $3.85, which is (still) much more than $2.00. However, Option B also introduces 
a 10% chance of getting a relatively unattractive downside of $0.10. Here, Option B has an 
expected value of $3.475, which is still much more than $1.96, but it now involves some 
downside risk. Is it rational to choose Option A in this circumstance? It could be, for someone 
who was very fearful of the 10% chance of $0.10 and was willing to trade almost half of Option 
B’s expected value to escape that risk. We call such a person highly risk averse. (In practice, 
almost all subjects continue choose option B at this juncture.) 
Moving upwards, now consider Row 8. The size of the monetary rewards remain the 
same, but now the percentages have changed. Option A gives a 20% chance of $1.60, and Option 
B gives a 20% chance of only $0.10. A sufficiently risk averse person will still favor Option A, 
but it does not take as much risk aversion to justify doing so as it did in the previous case 
discussed above. This progressive logic continues as we move up Table 2, and by the time we 
reach the top row of Table 2, Option B has only a 10% chance of the high payoff of $3.85, with a 
90% chance of $0.10. The expected value of Option B is only $0.475. In contrast, Option A, with 
a 10% chance of $2.00 and a 90% chance of $1.60, has an expected value of $1.64. Here almost 
everyone will choose Option A in practice. And indeed, only an extremely risk-seeking subject 
would choose Option B in the top row.  
As one proceeds up the chart, from Row 10 (where everyone chooses Option B), to Row 
1, (where almost everyone chooses Option A), each subject will eventually switch from Option B 
to Option A. Once the subject has switched from Option B to Option A, she should not (as a 
matter of theory) and generally does not (as a matter of practice) switch back. The unique row on 
the chart where the subject switches gives us a scaled measure of how risk averse or seeking that 
subject is. To be more precise, from the switching point one can compute upper and lower 
bounds of the subject’s tolerance for risk, defined by the rows above and below the point of 
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switching. The implications of these bounds is explored more fully below and in the Appendix. 
For now, the key thing to understand is that one can use these estimates of risk aversion as 
controls for the underlying general risk tolerances of each subject in our experiment. 
 
3. Subject Pool, Recruitment and Compensation. Our data come from multiple waves of subjects, 
recruited across different platforms. We first conducted a series of the above experiments in the 
lab at Iowa State University, using students as subjects.  The responses of these subjects were  
collected on a paper form, and the roll of a die determined the payoff for those subjects who chose 
the risky option. In this wave (and all the others), subjects were randomly assigned to either the 
“Invest in Invention” frame treatment group or the “Simple Lottery” frame control group, and the 
order of presentation of the certain and the risky options was randomly presented as either the first 
or the second option. 
 We then migrated our experiments to the M-Turk platform, using a Qualtrics format to 
collect the data and roll a simulated, electronic die.  M-Turk subjects were paid in experimental 
dollars that converted to one-fourth of the lab payoffs.93 
 Finally, we replicated the experiments using a Qualtrics survey emailed to college students 
and conducted entirely online.  Subjects chose to be paid by Amazon gift card, PayPal, or a check.  
The payoffs were expressed in experimental dollars that converted to one half of the monetary 
payoffs offered in the lab payoffs. 
 In addition to our baseline condition, we stress tested our results with a variety of 
robustness checks. Of particular note, we confronted a select subset of our subjects (drawn from 
the Mechanical Turk (M-Turk) and Online experiments) with a slightly varied vignette in which 
downside risk also presented the possibility of negative payoffs.  For the negative-payoff 
conditions, Option A or Keep provided earnings of [$8],94 just as in the baseline.  But for Option 
B or Invest in Invention, we informed subjects that “there is a 1/3 chance that your earnings will 
be [$42], and a 2/3 chance that your earnings will be [-$3] . . . .  These earnings or losses will be 
added to or subtracted from your [$5] participation fee.”  
 In two additional robustness checks, we reran versions of the baseline experiments with 
slightly modified frames, both of which reverted to the baseline “can’t lose money” setup. In the 
“Invest Only” version, the risky choice was framed without language referring to a “hypothetical 
inventions.”  In the “Endow Only” version, the risky choice was framed in a manner that addresses 
possibilities of endowment effects in our baseline experiments. (Both robustness tests are 
described in greater detail in the next Section of this article.) 
 
93 We made the M-Turk payoffs about the same as the M-Turk subjects could make in other M-Turk tasks. In 
contrast, the subjects in the brick-and-mortar lab were paid more because they had to spend much more time, 
including getting to and from the lab, to do the experiment. Also, they could not take the experiment at their 
convenience. Thus, the brick-and-mortar lab subjects had a much higher cost of participating in the experiment than 
did the M-Turk subjects. The Qualtrics at Iowa State subjects were paid an intermediate amount, representing a 
notion that although they could take the experiment at their convenience, they had many demands on their time, 
most prominently homework. Thus, we were attempting to compete with the opportunity costs of their time. We do 
not believe that the different levels of payment in the different contexts changed the results. See John Gibson & 
David Johnson, The Economic Relevancy of Risk Preferences Elicited Online and With Low Stakes, MPRA (June 8, 
2018), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87231/1/MPRA_paper_87231.pdf (finding that preferences are preserved 
online and with small stakes when compared to other published experimental results). 
94 As described above, in the Qualtrics online surveys shown to M-Turker and Iowa State students, we converted the 
dollars to experimental dollars.  In those experiments, we used a mythical monetary symbol ₳ to refer to the payouts 
to avoid confusing subjects. (We provided subjects with information that would allow them to make appropriate 
monetary conversions.) 
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In all, we report on experiments with 1,159 subjects, drawn from laboratory, M-Turk and 
Qualtrics Online student populations. For each group, subjects were then randomly assigned to 
treatment and control arms as listed in Table 3: 
 
 
 Laboratory Mechanical Turk Qualtrics Online 
Baseline Treatment Group – Can’t Lose $ 51 101 59 
Baseline Control Group – Can’t Lose $ 49 92 60 
Baseline Treatment Group – Can Lose $ 0 102 78 
Baseline Control Group – Can Lose $ 0 100 80 
Robustness Treatment Group – Invest Only 0 94 0 
Robustness Control Group – Invest Only 0 90 0 
Robustness Treatment Group – Endow Only 0 102 0 
Robustness Control Group – Endow Only  0 100 0 
Subtotals 100 781 277 
Table 3:  Distribution of Subjects by Population and Version 
 
 
 We also collected a variety of demographic control variables for each subject, as specified 
in Table 4 below.   
 
 
 
Collected Variables Description 
Age Subject’s age 
Gender Dummy=1 if subject is male 
Hand Dummy=1 if subject is left-handed 
Ethnicity Dummy=1 if subject is non-white 
Gambled Dummy=1 if subject has gambled for fun before 
Table 4: List of variables and descriptions 
 
 Figure 1 and Table 5 below describe the breakdown of these various demographic variables 
(as well as the proportional representation of M-Turkers in our subject pool). 
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Figure 1: Breakdown of subjects by several demographic variables 
 
Variables Responses Frequency Percentage 
Gambled 
Gambled for Fun Before 804 69.49 
Never Gambled for Fun 353 30.51 
Ethnicity 
White 946 81.76 
Non-White 211 18.24 
Hand 
Right-Handed or Ambidextrous 1,038 89.71 
Left-Handed 119 10.29 
Gender 
Female 508 43.91 
Male 649 56.09 
Age 
18-24 415 35.87 
25-44 596 51.51 
45-64 133 11.5 
65 and Older 13 1.12 
Subjects 
ISU Students 376 32.5 
M-Turkers 781 67.5 
Table 5: Number of subjects by variables and responses 
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Finally, we elicited from each of our subjects a Holt-Loury “score” coinciding with the first row 
from Table 2 (above) at which the subject switched away from the low variability Option A, and 
into the high variability Option B. The histogram of switching points (as a frequency of the 
entire population of subjects) is depicted in Figure 2 below. Overall, the median switching point 
was at row 7, with a mean of 6.43 and a standard deviation of 2.23. Note from the figure that just 
under 6 percent of our subjects appear to manifest significant risk tolerance, opting for Option B 
out of the gate, in the first row of Table 2. In addition, note that 3.86 percent of our subjects 
favor Option A across all rows—a behavior that seems pathological once Row 10 is reached 
(since there is no risk in Row 10 and Option B dominates). For the sake of transparency, we 
retain these subjects for our results reported below, but we have confirmed that their exclusion 
does not materially change our results. 
 
 
Figure 2: H-L Scores (first row where subject opted for Option B over Option A) 
 
 
III. RESULTS 
 
 Our primary results are shown in Figure 3 below, which illustrates the rate at which subjects 
opted for the “safe” choice depending on the frame presented to them. The left panel (3A) depicts 
the results of our largest, “baseline” experiment (“Invest in Invention Frame (Can’t Lose 
Money”)), which tracks the exact wording of the hypotheticals as presented at the beginning of 
Section II.  The right panel (3B) represents the results from the version of the experiment where it 
was possible to lose money with the risky choice (“Invest in Invention Frame (Can Lose Money)”).  
As is clear from the Figure, subjects in the experiment version where losing money was possible 
(3B) opted for safety more frequently than when they could not lose money (3A). This effect alone 
should not be surprising (since frame 3B both introduces negative payoffs and increases the 
variance of the gamble represented by the risky option). More provocative, however, is the effect 
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of the randomized framing treatment on both groups. In the can’t-lose-money subjects, framing 
the risky choice as an investment in innovation induced them to move from slightly preferring the 
risky option (56% to 44%) to strongly preferring the risky option (66% to 33%) far less frequently 
than when asked to choose between the safe option and an unadorned lottery ticket. The same 
inclination held in the right panel, and indeed the framing even caused subjects to “flip” from 
disfavoring the risky option (47% to 53%) to favoring it (56% to 44%).  
 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of subjects choosing the sure thing by frame 
 
The striking effect depicted above of the invention frame on manifest risk tolerance is 
statistically significant at conventional levels. The left panel (Panel 3A) depicts our baseline 
manipulation, where the risky choice did not entail the possibility of losing money. Here, the 
“Invest in Innovation” frame caused the treatment group to opt for the risky choice at a nearly 2-
to-1 ratio, even though they were more evenly split in the control group setting. The difference in 
risk-taking proclivity between the treatment and control groups was 11.1%, which was statistically 
significant at conventional levels.  
Even when we situate our subjects in a setting where they can lose money (Panel 3B), the effect 
of the frame continues to persist (in only slightly weaker form).  Here, control-group subjects 
actually tended to prefer the safe option—an observation that is not surprising given the possibility 
of losing money and the wider variability of the risky choice. But introducing the frame flipped 
this proclivity, causing more subjects now to favor the risky choice.  The difference between 
treatment and control groups here was smaller—just under 9%—and its statistical significance was 
slightly reduced. But the effect is still appears to be discernible. 
The tables below drill a little deeper in our results, reporting on ordinary least squares estimates 
of both (a) our baseline specification where subjects could never lose money from opting for the 
risky choice (Table 6); and (b) the specification that includes the robustness test where negative 
payoffs are possible (Table 7). In addition to our control/treatment assignment (which was random, 
and should be sufficient alone95), these tables also control for a variety of demographic variables, 
including (importantly) fixed effects for the HL “row” where the subject switches from low 
variability to high variability choice.96   
 
95 Since we randomize assignment of treatment and control, it is not strictly necessary to control for other variables. 
We do so anyway, however, to underscore the effect, and because we have information on risk preferences. 
96 See Table 1, supra. 
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The key coefficient of interest for each model in the Tables is the first line, which reports the 
probability difference between the treatment and control groups in choosing the “safe” over the 
“risky” option. (Thus, a negative coefficient indicates that the subjects are more likely to choose 
the risky option.) As we can see across Table 6, the innovation frame induces between 11% and 
13.4% lower probability of opting for the safe option, regardless of other variables we control for 
(including baseline measured risk aversion). Moreover, it does not appear that introducing the 
prospect of losing money materially undermines the estimated effect (though it does slightly 
reduce it).  Note from the subsequent Table 7 that the estimated coefficient of interest now ranges 
between 9% and 11.5%, but it remains statistically significant by conventional measures.  
 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
INVENTION FRAME -0.111* -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.121*** -0.134* -0.134** 
  (-2.32) (-3.00) (-3.00) (-2.73) (-2.34) (-2.34) 
GAMBLED     0.021 -0.014 -0.037 -0.035 
      (0.44) (-0.28) (-0.75) (-0.71) 
AGE       0.009*** 0.002 0.001 
        (3.62) (0.53) (0.29) 
MALE       -0.018 -0.048 -0.001 
        (-0.41) (-1.06) (-0.02) 
HAND       -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 
        (-0.30) (-0.30) (-0.29) 
ETHNICITY       0.064 0.05 0.045 
        (1.15) (0.90) (0.82) 
TURK         0.220* 0.297*** 
          (2.33) (2.65) 
MALE x TURK           -0.11 
            (-1.21) 
CONSTANT 0.443*** 0.580*** 0.563*** 0.328+ 0.441*** 0.437*** 
  (12.61) (3.74) (3.53) (1.95) (2.79) (2.77) 
R-sqd 0.013 0.183 0.183 0.212 0.23 0.233 
p 0.0200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 412 412 412 412 412 412 
HL Switch FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 6: Baseline Experiments - Losing Money Not Possible – OLS Estimation 
  T-Statistics in Parentheses       
  + = Significant at 5% (one tailed test); 10% (two tailed test) 
  * = Significant at 2.5% (one tailed test); 5% (two tailed test) 
  ** = Significant at 1% (one tailed test); 2% (two tailed test) 
  *** = Significant at 0.5% (one tailed test); 1% (two tailed test) 
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  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6   
INVENTION FRAME -0.089+ -0.103* -0.102+ -0.105* -0.112* -0.114*   
  (-1.70) (-1.98) (-1.95) (-1.98) (-2.08) (-2.12)   
GAMBLED     -0.04 -0.038 -0.031 -0.035   
      (-0.74) (-0.65) (-0.54) (-0.60)   
AGE       0.001 0.003 0.003   
        (0.31) (0.89) (0.73)   
GENDER       -0.034 -0.02 0.021   
        (-0.60) (-0.35) (0.25)   
HAND       -0.011 -0.016 -0.014   
        (-0.09) (-0.14) (-0.12)   
ETHNICITY       -0.006 0.009 0.006   
        (-0.08) (0.12) (0.08)   
TURK         -0.076 -0.021   
          (-0.91) (-0.19)   
MALE x TURK           -0.079   
            (-0.70)   
CONSTANT 0.533*** 0.710*** 0.743*** 0.733*** 0.705*** 0.700***   
  (14.44) (4.90) (4.84) (4.18) (3.96) (3.93)   
R-sqd 0.008 0.073 0.074 0.076 0.078 0.079   
p 0.0900 0.0030 0.0030 0.0190 0.0240 0.0290   
N 360 360 360 360 360 360   
HL Switch FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Table 7: Baseline Experiments - Can Lose Money – OLS Estimation   
  T-Statistics in Parentheses         
  + = Significant at 5% (one tailed test); 10% (two tailed test)   
  * = Significant at 2.5% (one tailed test); 5% (two tailed test)   
  ** = Significant at 1% (one tailed test); 2% (two tailed test)   
  *** = Significant at 0.5% (one tailed test); 1% (two tailed test)   
 
The growth in the estimated coefficient of interest that emerges in Models 2-6 once we 
control for underlying risk aversion (captured by HL score) might seem odd initially, but it is an 
artifact of the heterogeneity of the underlying risk tolerances of our subject pool, which adds noise 
to our estimates. As illustrated above in Figure 2, some of our subjects start out as extremely risk 
preferring (low HL scores) or extremely risk averse (high HL scores). When one controls for their 
baseline risk aversion (which we elicited independently), the remaining estimated effect is better 
able to capture the effect of the frame. In fact, in the Appendix, we present alternative 
specifications that show the same effects in a set of slightly more nuanced “discrete choice” 
frameworks.97 From those models, our estimates (when projected onto a subject at median HL risk 
aversion score) imply between a 16 to 18 percent swing in the favored choice—a change that is 
consistent with a one-category shift in the HL scale pictured in Figure 2, or just under one half of 
 
97 In Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B, we illustrate the robustness of our OLS results in Probit and Logit 
specifications. 
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a standard deviation in HL score. But in any event, regardless of representativeness of either 
sample, the estimated effect appears to be consistent and economically significant across them.  
 
Overall, the above analysis suggests that our manipulation appears to have generated a 
material contextual shift to subjects’ risk tolerances, consistent with our hypothesis. Averaged 
across all subjects, the manipulation induces a larger propensity to pursue the risky choice of 
approximately ten percentage points. When one controls for variation related to the subjects’ 
underlying risk aversion, these estimates get even larger, and it appears to be relatively consistent 
across specifications, and strongly statistically significant under any conventional measures.  The 
only right-hand-side control variable that appears stronger than the manipulation is whether the 
subject was an M-Turk subject. Which group is the “better” one for purposes of external validity 
is, of course, debatable. Some studies have found US-based M-Turkers who participate in 
experiments to be more representative of the US population than conventional student samples, 
and that M-Turkers pay as much attention to experimental tasks as undergraduates in a lab.98 
 
 
IV. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 Our findings have important implications, both for what they add to the experimental 
analysis of law and for a variety of practical legal policy debates around innovative activities. This 
section explores several of those broader implications, as well as potential caveats.  First, we offer 
an interpretation of how our results fit into the experimental literature more broadly, focusing on 
robustness of our experimental effect and its limitations. We next discuss how our findings 
intersect with a variety of ongoing policy debates within intellectual property and corporate law 
about how (and whether) law should accommodate risk preferences. Finally, we discuss the 
broader potential consequences of our results. 
 
A. Limitations and Robustness  
 
 Although the previous section has already explored one principal area of robustness of 
our results (i.e., whether they carry over to contexts where subjects could lose money), there are 
a variety of other avenues that merit brief exploration, all having to do with the outer limits / 
boundaries of the framing effect we identify. This subsection briefly explores several of them. 
  
1. Invest in Invention Frame 
 
 The “Invest in Invention” frame highlighted in the previous section triggers what appears 
to be a noteworthy shock to manifest risk tolerance. But that result, in turn, raises the interesting 
and obvious question about which element of our frame is the culprit: is it the “invest” portion, the 
“invention” portion, or perhaps a little of both. Because our baseline experiment employed the 
prompt “invest in a hypothetical invention,” 99  it does not allow us (yet) to pick apart the 
contributions of each attribute.  To test one aspect of this quandary—whether the crucial frame is 
 
98 Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse Chandler & Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running Experiments on Mechanical Turk, 5 
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 415 (2010). 
99 We needed to use the word “hypothetical” to avoid possibly misleading some subjects into believing that 
there was a real invention involved in the experiment.  There was not. 
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“invest” or “invest in invention”— we ran an additional set of experiments to concentrate on a 
single element (in this case the “invest” part).  We reran the experiment with a new sample 
(n=184), but this time we provided our treatment subjects with a different set of instructions, telling 
them only that the risky choice coincided with an opportunity to “invest” in a risky choice; no 
possibility of an invention coming out of the investment was mentioned. Our new treatment 
vignette thus read as follows: 
 
Before filling out a brief questionnaire, you will be given [$8] either to Keep or to 
Invest.  You will have only a single opportunity to choose.  If you choose to Invest 
there is a 1/3 chance that your earnings will be [$30], 100 and a 2/3 chance that your 
earnings will be [$3].  A roll of a die will determine your earnings, either [$30] or 
[$3].  If you choose to Keep you will keep the [$8]. 
 
 We then compared the results for this modified treatment group to a control group who had 
been given the “Simple Lottery” instructions, described above. These results are given in Figure 4 
below. Unlike in the prior analyses, here the “Invest” framing generally has no statistically 
significant effect across the different models. Although the effect goes in the same direction as in 
the baseline experiments, it significantly smaller in magnitude. Moreover, as shown in the 
Appendix, the insignificant result remains (and even gets a little weaker) after controlling for other 
characteristics (such as elicited risk aversion). At a minimum, we view these results as suggesting 
that the removal of the “innovation” component of the frame is critical, and it substantially nullifies 
the risk-aversion dampening effect discussed above. If anything, in fact, this robustness test 
suggests that the effect of an innovation frame is even stronger than we advertise. 
 
 
Figure 4: Robustness Test with Invest (but no Invention) Frame 
 
 In Appendix C, we show that the direction of our estimated results and the significance 
were qualitatively identical for a variety of regression specifications.101  Given these additional 
 
100 Again, in the online experiments, we used the mythical monetary symbol ₳ to refer to the payouts instead of 
$.  In this article, we use brackets around dollar signs to reflect this minor variation among versions. 
101 See Appendix B. 
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experiments, we can rule out, with some confidence, that the prospect of “investing” alone is a 
sufficient factor for generating our main results.  At the same time, it remains possible that the 
“investing” frame may be necessary for our results, interacting with the innovation frame to 
produce a meaningful combined effect. While we conjecture that an interaction effect is plausible 
(and even likely), we leave that exploration for later work.102 
 
2. Endowment Effects 
 
 Second, as noted above, our baseline treatment condition for the risky investment used the 
word “keep” to characterize the safe option, while the control group (the “Simple Lottery” frame) 
was asked to choose between safe and risky options. One might thus worry that this wording 
introduced a type of “endowment effect” unrelated to our principal manipulation that ultimately 
drives our results.103  
We are relatively confident this concern is unfounded, based on both a priori reasoning 
and on an additional robustness check. As to the former, we observe that the endowment effects 
literature long ago identified that the effect usually vanishes when the “endowment” takes the form 
of a monetary sum (or a liquid claim on a monetary sum).104 But even if the endowment effect 
were present in our baseline experiment, its typical directionality would cause us to understate the 
overall size of our findings: Indeed, if subjects in the “Invest in Invention” frame thought they 
were entitled to the $8 before deciding whether to invest, then they should have been less willing 
to give up the $8, causing them to appear to be more risk averse in the “Invest in Invention” frame 
when compared to the control.  However, we find diametrically opposite behavior. Accounting for 
an endowment effect (if one even exists in this context) would only make our detected effect larger.  
 Nevertheless, in response to several questions along these lines from other researchers, we 
explored the issue a bit further, and re-ran a version of our experiment that focused only on the 
word “keep.”  We recruited a new set of subjects (all M-Turkers), and gave the treatment group 
alternatively worded instructions that read as follows: 
  
Before filling out a brief questionnaire, you will be given [$8] and asked to make a 
choice between Option A and Option B.  You will have only a single opportunity 
to choose.  If you chose Option A, you will Keep the [$8].  If you chose Option 
B, there is a 1/3 chance that your earnings will be [$30], and a 2/3 chance that your 
earnings will be [$3].  A role of a die will determine your earnings, either [$30] or 
[$3]. 
 
 
102 We found it challenging—using a sufficiently similar vignette as our baseline experiment—to design a 
satisfactory robustness test that dropped the “invest” frame to focus only on the “invention” component.   
103 Note that some economists and legal scholars doubt the robustness of the empirical evidence supporting the 
endowment effect.  See generally Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory:  Experimental 
Economics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 2 (2013).  Other researchers believe that subjects can debias to 
overcome any endowment effect. Jennifer Arlen & Stephan Tontrup, Does the Endowment Effect Justify Legal 
Intervention: the Debiasing Effect of Institutions, 44 J.L. STUD. 143 (2015).  For the purpose of this discussion, we 
will assume that the endowment effect—the tendency of people to value what they own more highly because they 
own the assets—is real. 
104 See generally Klass & Zeiler, supra; Arlen & Tontrup, supra. 
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Notice that this variation strips out the “Invest in Invention” frame and retains only the “Keep” 
terminology, so as to isolate any endowment effects. If the endowment effect is at play (in the 
opposite direction as its usual manifestation), we should detect it here. 
 We then ran the same diagnostics with this additional robustness check.105 The basic results 
are pictured in Figure 5.  As can be seen by the figure, subjects in this condition now tend to choose 
the risky option at relatively close rates between treatment and control, with no statistically 
significant difference between them.106  We consider these results to add additional experimental 
support to the a priori reasoning that our results are unlikely to be an artifact of the endowment 
effect, channeled by telling subjects (in the baseline experiment) that they could “keep” $8. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Robustness Test with Endowment Only Frame 
 
 
3. No False Preferences 
 
Neoclassical welfare economics tends to assume that preferences are fixed and stable 
across contexts. Behavioral economics and psychology, in contrast, tend to resist that foundational 
assumption (at least categorically). This study is an example of the latter group. It is important to 
note that we (like many other exercises in behavioral economics and psychology) cannot 
definitively determine that only one set of revealed preferences—e.g., the ones in the “Simple 
Lottery” frame, or in the “Invest in Invention” frame—is the “true” set of preferences for purposes 
of welfare analysis.  In fact, both sets of preferences may be true, just for different settings and 
 
105  Our control group in this robustness check used “Simple Lottery” frame, which recall featured the 
following instructions: 
Before filling out a brief questionnaire, you will be asked to make a choice between Option A and Option 
B.  You will have only a single opportunity to choose. After you have made your choice, if you chose 
Option A your earnings will be [$8].  If you chose Option B, there is a 1/3 chance that your earnings will 
be [$30], and a 2/3 chance that your earnings will be [$3].  A role of a die will determine your earnings, 
either [$30] or [$3]. 
106 See also the regression results in Appendix D, infra. Per our prior discussion, note that even the directionality of 
the (statistically insignificant) difference between treatment and control groups moves in the opposite direction as 
what one would expect if an endowment effect were present.  
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contexts.  And, given that each set of preferences is true within its setting, the results are quite 
usable for policy purposes. Consider the “Invest in Invention” frame, where the experiments 
explicitly employ the word “invention.”  As illustrated above, subjects became discernibly more 
willing to take on the gamble under such a frame.  This response could be because subjects enjoyed 
feeling that they were part of an exciting enterprise, leading to new, useful knowledge, and thereby 
producing higher utility from the choice.107  There could also be an effect from knowing that 
inventions are prosocial, leading to spillover knowledge that helps society.  We attempted to mute 
the potential excitement and prosocial effects by referring to the invention as a ‘hypothetical’ 
invention.  But both of these are perfectly valid reasons for preferring the gamble in the “Invest in 
Invention” frame, but not in the stripped-down “Simple Lottery” frame. And that difference in 
willingness to take the positive-expected-value gamble is all we need to talk about a variety of 
important implications for legal and public policy (addressed below). 
  
4. M-Turkers and Risk 
 
 Finally, our results suggest a potentially important methodological “pro tip” for using on-
line platforms (such as M-Turk) for experimental data collection. As noted above, experimental 
researchers have expressed some doubts about the validity (external and internal) of using M-Turk 
subjects—even as many take advantage of the data source. And we can confirm that M-Turkers 
do act “differently” from in-lab subjects. For example, subjects from M-Turk were consistently 
more risk averse than our other subjects. This was true even after controlling for age, sex, and 
ethnicity.  But in our case, it did not matter appreciably: for our M-Turk subjects changed behavior 
in the same way that the other subjects changed in response to the “Invest in Invention” frame; all 
subject groups (M-Turkers and not) became less risk averse in our treatment condition. We also 
tried interacting Female with M-Turk, but the results were insignificant, and did not change the 
effect or significance of the “Invest in Invention” frame. Thus, it appears that M-Turk can be used 
to test the effect of frames like the one we used. However, because there are underlying differences 
between M-Turk and laboratory populations, it makes sense to sample from both populations (at 
least initially) to confirm that the platform does not introduce an unintended behavioral pathology 
capable of producing spurious experimental results.108  
 
B. Broader Implications 
 
      Beyond contributing to the stock of knowledge in the experimental study of law, our results 
also have implications for a variety of legal and policy debates. We flag several of them below. 
 
1. Implications for Intellectual Property 
 
As noted in the Introduction to this article, our findings suggest that at least some of the 
concerns about recent judicial rulings limiting patentable subject matter109 may be overblown. A 
 
107 We note that our subjects were not tasked with actually inventing anything.  Rather, they were asked if they 
wanted to invest in an invention. 
108 This will be the subject of a short paper on methodology that we hope to produce in the future. 
109 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative 
Services, 915 F.3d. 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC (Fed. Cir. 2019); 
Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., LLC (Fed. Cir. 2019); Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. v. 
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socially desirable patent policy is based, in part, upon assessing the risk tolerances of  investors in 
inventive activity.110 Our findings suggest that in innovative environments, entrepreneurs and 
investors may be comparatively more tolerant of risk than previously recognized. Accordingly, we 
may not need to be as concerned about providing compensation to investors and inventors so as to 
ameliorate their risk aversion. In fact, given that patent policy may already reflect a premium for 
such previously assumed risk aversion, the recent judicial decisions restricting patent may actually 
be more socially beneficial (or at least less socially harmful) than scholars and commentators have 
feared. Of course, our findings do not touch upon concerns about copying, a separate rationale for 
the patent incentive. 
One may reasonably ask: how is the entire IP ecosystem (and not just individual actors) 
implicated by our experiments? To begin to answer this question, consider a simple example. 
Assume that there are an inventor and an investor. Both must participate in order to produce a 
positive chance of making a successful invention. The investor provides some initial money, $A, 
to the inventor, and then, contingent on the success of the invention in the marketplace, takes a 
portion of the revenues. Similarly, the inventor will need at least to expend effort valued at $B to 
invent. We will assume that failure implies a $0, no salvage, outcome. Suppose that there is a 
probability, p, of success (which means both technological and market success). It follows that in 
order to induce the parties to participate even if they are risk neutral, we would need to provide 
each party with sufficient rewards to compensate them for their foregone investment of capital and 
effort.  
Because this is a joint activity, both parties must anticipate receiving sufficient compensation 
to make the invention a real possibility. Thus, even for risk neutral parties, a successful invention 
must produce at least $(#$%)' 	so as to induce both investment and inventive activity.111 How is the 
return to the invention allocated? Corporate and commercial rules and practices control how and 
in what way the monetizable value is split up, affecting the likelihood that both the investor and 
inventor receive sufficient compensation.  
But what if the investor and/or inventor are risk averse? In that case, and holding the inventor’s 
characteristics fixed for the moment, adjusting for risk aversion would require increasing the 
investor’s reward by an additional risk premium ($𝛼). The size of the risk premium, moreover, 
increases in the investor’s risk aversion. A similar argument applies to the inventor, who would 
require her own risk premium ($𝛽). Consequently, for risk averse parties a successful invention 
would have to offer an even larger bounty, of: 
 $(𝐴 + 𝐵)𝑝 + $(𝛼 + 𝛽)𝑝  
 
Our results suggest that the baseline level of risk aversion, as defined in the pure lottery condition, 
appears to fall (for whatever reason) in the “invest in invention” frame. Consequently, the total 
 
CEPHEID (Fed. Cir. 2018); Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC (Fed. Cir. 2017); Genetic 
Techs. Ltd. v. Merial L.L.C. (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re 
BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig. (Fed. Cir. 2014); PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd. 
(Fed. Cir. 2012).  
110 See discussion, supra, at I.A.2. 
111 The traditional “garage inventor” example combines $A/p and $B/p into one person, and thus makes it very hard 
to see what is going on. The garage inventor essentially invests in her own inventive activity. The text, and our 
experiments, separate out these functions. 
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added risk premium needed to induce investment and activity—or $(($))'  — need not grow as large 
as one might otherwise believe in such contexts. This insight, in turn, implies that it may be 
possible to loosen some of the IP (patent) doctrines that help to produce the returns that help to 
provide the money. 
This basic policy result—that we can relax some of the institutional commitments that help to 
channel risk premiums into required returns—has very important potential implications for various 
patent (and copyright) doctrines that attempt (at least implicitly) to calibrate return to creative 
effort. These include the doctrine of equivalents, the availability of injunctive relief, patent 
duration, damages, and obviousness. Viewed through the lens of our results, each of these 
doctrines could potentially be modulated to fine tune the patent system, and a careful 
reconsideration of these doctrines may be warranted, in the light of our evidence that risk aversion 
may retreat in these settings. To wit:  
 
• Doctrine of Equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents permits a finding of infringement even 
in circumstances in which an accused product or process is outside the literal scope of the 
claimed invention.112 The product or process can infringe if it is insubstantially different 
from the claimed invention, or if it “performs substantially the same function, in 
substantially the same way, to reach the same result.”113 The doctrine addresses patent 
scope, and has ebbed and flowed in its breadth over time. Reducing (enlarging) the scope 
of the doctrine of equivalents is functionally similar to reducing (increasing) the return 
premium on a patent.  
• Injunctions. In its 2005 eBay v. MercExchange decision114, the Supreme Court made it 
harder for successful patentees to be awarded an injunction as a remedy. Previously, the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit had a practice of granting an injunction to almost 
all successful litigating patent holders. That is no longer the case.115 The less likely a patent 
owner is to receive injunctive relief, the lower the return on investment. The effects of eBay 
have been most pronounced on non-practicing entities (NPEs, sometimes pejoratively 
called “patent trolls”).116 Restricting injunctive relief to those practicing the patent and 
 
112 David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 
(2011); John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 955 (2007). 
113 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 609 (1950) (noting two tests for infringement 
under the doctrine of equivalents,: if [1] “the accused product performs ‘substantially the same function in 
substantially the same way to obtain the same result’”) and [2] the insubstantial differences test (“whether the 
accused product or process is substantially different from what is patented)”); See also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. 
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).   
114  Ebay Inc. v. MercExchange, L. L. C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) 
115 Injunctive relief in patent cases continues to be a source of controversy. See Ryan T. Holte & Christopher B. 
Seaman, Patent Injunctions on Appeal: An Empirical Study of the Federal Circuit's Application of Ebay, 92 WASH. 
L. REV. 145 (2017)(providing empirical study showing, inter alia, that injunctive patent relief is not routine in the 
District Courts); Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L.& ECON. REV. 280 
(2010)(arguing against the availability of patent injunctions with a formal economic model); and Erik Hovenkamp & 
Thomas F. Cotter, Anticompetitive Patent Injunctions, 100 MINN. L. REV. 871 (2016)(arguing against patent 
injunctions for firms that own a patent but neither practice the patent nor license it on reasonable terms, even if the 
patent owner produces goods in the same market as those who practice the patent). 
116 Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation after eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. 
REV. 1949 (2016). Also Matthew Spitzer, Patent Trolls, Nuisance Suits, and the Federal Trade Commission, 20 
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 75 (2018). 
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manufacturing products reduces the premium that the successful inventor can extract, since 
it is now harder to hold out in negotiating with high-valuing licensees.  
• Duration. Many scholars have argued for using the duration of patent protection (i.e., the 
patent term) as a lever to encourage innovation in a field.117 In general, under current law 
patents in the U.S. expire twenty years from their filing. That term is in accord with various 
international treaties.118 Putting aside international comity concerns,119 patent term could 
be adjusted upwards or downwards to fine tune the premium associated with successful 
innovations. 
• Damages Measures. The Federal Circuit has made it harder and harder for plaintiffs to 
prove reasonable royalty damages in patent cases.120 Copyright is different, with a form of 
liquidated damages,121 available in many situations. The ability to get adequate damages 
dramatically affects the return from the invention. 
• Enhanced Damages. In Halo Electronics v. Pulse Electronics,122 the Supreme Court in 
2016 made it slightly easier to obtain enhanced damages for willful patent infringement. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the previous two-part test for finding willfulness was unduly 
rigid.123 The greater the likelihood of higher damages for a patent holder, the greater the 
effective premium from invention. 
 
117 See M. Rafiquzzaman, The Optimal Patent Term Under Uncertainty, 5 INT. J. INDUS. ORG. 233 (1987) (arguing 
that different types of uncertainty produces different effects on the optimal patent term); Mark A. Lemley, An 
Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369 (1994)(concluding that a 20 year term from 
date of application usually gives patentees more protection than did the old term of 17 years from date of patent 
issuance.) The term of copyright protection has also been a subject of intense debate. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & 
William Michael Treanor, Eldlred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as 
Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331 (2003); Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term 
Extension Legislation, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 199 (2002); Rufus Pollock, Forever Minus a Day?  Some Theory and 
Empirics of Optimal Copyright, 6 REV. ECON. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 35 (2009). Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1436186; William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. L. STUD. 325 (1989). 
118 For a discussion of the TRIPS agreement as it relates to patent duration, see David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur 
Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and Incentives to Innovation, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613 (2008). 
119 See Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Bruce H. Kobayashi, Douglas H. Ginsburg, & Joshua D. Wright, Extra-
Jurisdictional Remedies Involving Patent Licensing, COMPETITION POLICY INT’L (Dec. 14, 2016) (explaining the 
importance of international comity concerns when considering intellectual property rights). 
120 VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[W]hen claims are drawn to an 
individual component of a multi-component product, it is the exception, not the rule, that damages may be based 
upon the value of the multi-component product.”); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) ((“This case provides a good example of the danger of admitting consideration of the entire market value 
of the accused [product] where the patented component does not create the basis for customer demand.”); Lucent 
Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2009); John M. Golden, Reasonable Certainty in 
Contract and Patent Damages, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257, 261 (2017) (“the Federal Circuit issued a series of 
decisions tightening the evidentiary standards for establishing the value of reasonable royalty damages”); Jonas 
Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 Am. U.L. Rev. 961, 1000–02 (2014) 
(discussing a “flurry of noteworthy damages decisions from the [U.S. Court of Appeals for the] Federal Circuit”). 
121 Statutory damages of between $750 and $30,000 per work are available if the author has registered the work 
before the infringement began or within three months of publication. 17 U.S.C. § 504. 
122 Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc., 579 U.S. ___ (2016). 
123 See Brandon M. Reed, Who Determines What Is Egregious: Judge or Jury: Enhanced Damages after Halo v. 
Pulse, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 389 (2018)(discussing whether a judge or a jury decides whether willful, 
egregious misconduct justifies enhanced damages); and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35 Nature 
Biotechnology 421 (2017)(claiming that “few researchers are deterred from reading patents by concerns about 
enhanced legal liability”). 
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• Obviousness. Finally, the doctrine of obviousness ensures that patents are only granted for 
sufficient leaps over the prior art.124  A given invention is either obviousness or non-
obviousness, a binary determination.125 Concerns about “close call” inventions falling just 
below the bar add risk and may affect ex ante incentives.126 The line between obvious 
inventions and non-obvious ones can be altered to adjust the patent incentive. 
 
Any of the aforementioned doctrines (or some combination of them) represent a potential legal 
policy tool for altering the size of the patent incentive.  Of course, we are reluctant to conclude on 
the basis of a set of experiments that all or any of these areas should be changed to provide less 
protection compared to where patent doctrine is now. That is, we cannot conclude with absolute 
confidence that the length of IP protection should be shortened, the doctrine of equivalents should 
be made narrower, injunctive relief should be limited, or that damages for infringement should be 
capped or reduced. Such conclusions might follow if we were already convinced that current patent 
policy calibrated things pretty close to correct, on average, but erroneously assumed the parties’ 
risk preferences were much like anyone else’s. And we simply cannot be confident about that. The 
past two decades have seen a general assault on patent (but not copyright) from both the Courts 
and much of the academy.127 It has gotten to the point where some General Counsels in tech 
companies speak of “efficient infringement”, which essentially means that it is cheaper to infringe 
than take a license because it is so hard for patentees to obtain relief through the courts.128 If this 
critique is right – that the assault on patent has gone too far -- then probably patent law needs to 
be stronger. What do our results mean? They mean that when Congress is making patent protection 
stronger, they don’t need to go as far as they otherwise would when strengthening patent.  
 
 
124 Ryan T. Holte & Ted Sichelman, Cycles of Obviousness, 105 IOWA L. REV. 107 (2019); Daralyn J. Durie & Mark 
A. Lemley, A Realist Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, working paper, SocArXiv (Aug.25, 2016), 
osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/942dc. Ezra Friedman and Abraham Wickelgren, Optimal Standards of Proof in Patent 
Litigation: Infringement and Non-Obviousness, Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 19-07, available on 
SSRN at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3463873. 
125 Laura G. Pedraza-Farina & Ryan Whalen, A Network Theory of Patentability, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 109 (2019) 
(arguing that network analysis of obviousness determinations overcomes the “binary” nature of current doctrine.) 
126 Id. at 69 (noting the high risk of “hindsight bias” in the factfinder in “reconstructing” whether the invention is 
obviousness). 
127 The discussion in the Introduction of this article describes the basic issues. See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, 
Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1313, 1324 (2017) ("Academic theories 
concerning the adverse effects of a strong patent system would be of little practical interest were it not for the fact 
that policymaking entities have taken actions under patent or antitrust law, or issued influential statements, that 
explicitly or implicitly rely on, or are consistent with, those theories.”). See also Michele Boldrin and David K. 
Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3 (2013); Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and 
Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 280 (2010)(arguing against the availability of patent injunctions with a 
formal economic model); Carl Shapiro, Patent Remedies, 106 AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROC. 198 (2016);  
Nowhere has this assault been more powerful than in the area of Standard Essential Patents. Mark A. Lemley and 
Carl Shapiro, Patent Hold Up and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 1992 (2007);  Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. 
Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2012); Einer Elhauge, Do Patent 
Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically Excessive Royalties? 4 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 535 (2008); 
Alexander Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J. Comp. L. & 
Econ. 549 (2015). Patent assertion entities (also known as “trolls”) have generated a lot of criticism, as well. 
Matthew Spitzer, Patent Trolls, Nuisance Suits, and the Federal Trade Commission, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 75 
(2018). 
128 Private conversations between Matthew Spitzer and partners or General Counsels at significant technology firms.  
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2. Implications for Contract Law, Corporate Law, and Other Areas 
 
Another area where our results may have some import is in areas of corporate and contract law 
that pertain to the financing and governance of tech startups. As we noted in Section I, investors 
in innovative startups require sufficient returns to compensate them for their risk of investment 
and the risk of failure. But how much of a premium do they really require to take on such risk? 
How much control should they be given over the decision as to whether a startup should opt for a 
“safe exit” (often through an acquisition) or to continue the risky path of development for a hoped-
for future payday? How is a corporate board supposed to resolve such disputes when it is required 
to maximize value for all shareholders? 
As it happens, much of contemporary corporate law is currently in a state of flux over how to 
handle fiduciary duties when it comes to this very dispute between inventor / entrepreneurs and 
venture-capital (“VC”) investors of late-stage startups.129  As is typical in such relationships, 
founders (and core employees) typically receive common stock.130 In contrast, VC investors tend 
to receive preferred stock, giving them priority in any liquidation. 131  In addition, the VCs’ 
preferred shares typically enjoy a conversion option that provides an even greater return should 
the startup enjoy phenomenal success. 132  A considerable governance difficulty generically 
emerges when the company has done well enough to stay afloat, but not much more. In such 
circumstances there is a conflict of interest. The outside VC investors—usually preferred 
shareholders whose liquidation preferences are on the line—perceive considerable downside risk 
from continuing, and they have a strong preference to accept any purchase offer that gets close to 
their liquidation right. On the other hand, common shareholders perceive principally upside risk, 
and they strongly prefer to stay in the game, hoping for luck to turn in their favor.  
From a value-maximizing perspective, of course, an efficient allocation of fiduciary duties 
would grant solicitude between common and preferred in a way that maximizes their joint payoff, 
taking account of their risk preferences. If – as our results suggest -- VC investors in innovative 
industries exhibit reduced risk aversion, then it might well justify putting a heavier thumb on the 
scale favoring founders in such disputes. And this appears to be exactly what courts have recently 
begun to do. Consider, for example, Delaware Vice Chancellor Laster’s 2017 opinion in Hsu v. 
ODN Holding Corp.133 This case was substantially similar to the situation described above, pitting 
preferred shareholders, who wished to exit, against common shareholders, who resisted. Hoping 
to secure an exit, the preferred shareholders used their control of the board to facilitate payment of 
a contractual redemption right, thereby starving the firm of capital and effectively forcing an 
exit.134  After the common shareholders sued, the VC investors move to dismiss135. In denying that 
motion, the Vice Chancellor explicitly prioritized the interests of the common shareholders in the 
calculus of fiduciary obligations: 
 
129 See, e.g., Sarath Sanga & Eric Talley, Fiduciary Duties in the Presence of Multiple Classes of Stock (working 
paper, 2020). 
130 Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 
981-82 (2006) (“The preferred is held by VCs, who invest in startups almost exclusively through this type of 
security. In fact, most venture-backed startups issue a new series of preferred stock for each round of financing.”) 
131 Id. at 982-83.  
132 Id. at 982 (“Like most preferred stock, VCs’ preferred shares carry a liquidation preference and are convertible 
into common.”).  
133 Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108, 2017 WL 1437308 (Del. Ch. April 14, 2017). 
134 Id. at 5.  
135 Id. at 10.  
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 [I]t generally ‘will be the duty of the board, where discretionary judgment is to be 
exercised, to prefer the interests of common stock—as the good faith judgment of the 
board sees them to be—to the interests created by the special rights, preferences, etc., of 
preferred stock.’136 
 
Relative to our experimental findings, Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion may make 
considerable sense. Rather than according outside investors special treatment (and a premium) 
associated with their preference rights, he essentially held that the interests of preferred 
stockholders should instead be treated as no more than contractual, with no implied duty of the 
board to take account of their idiosyncratic preferences (including risk aversion).137 The growing 
body of opinions such as this effectively allocate how the available surplus from successful 
inventions is split between investors and inventors, particularly in the tech start up field, shifting 
that allocation slightly away from investors and towards inventors. 
 
C. Social Welfare 
 
 On a broader level, to the extent our results hold with actual investors in technology, they 
are potentially important for society as well. When a large number of gambles are repeated, each 
having significant positive expected value, and they are not overly correlated with each other, the 
aggregation of such gambles will almost certainly produce more wealth for society. Framing the 
risky choice as an investment in an invention induced more subjects to choose expected gambles 
with positive expected value. This may be good not only for the individuals; in the case of 
inventions, where many of the benefits are external to the particular invention, it is also good for 
society.  
 We should be clear about two important limitations of this argument, even within the scope 
of our study.  First, over a third of our subjects continued to opt for the certain (i.e., riskless) choice 
even in the “Invest in Invention” frame.138  From a social welfare standpoint, it is plausibly 
desirable that all subjects would opt to invest in the invention. We offered subjects a strongly 
expected-value-positive gamble—expected value of 12 compared to a certain option of only 8.  
Thus, some of our subjects left a significant expected value “on the table.” Put another way, from 
a social welfare point of view, our subjects could have done better. Hence, even though the results 
of our experiments provide some comfort, one still might be concerned about too much residual 
risk aversion. Second, as noted above, for any experimental approach external validity can (and 
should)  be a concern. We ran our experiments on a general population of students and M-Turkers.  
We did not run our experiments on either inventors or on those who typically invest in inventions 
(such as professional venture capitalists). Real-world inventors and investors in inventions might 
have different attitudes towards risk than do corporate executives and the general population.139 
Part of our plans for the future include running our experiment on these populations. Until then, 
one should be conservative when making policy prescriptions based on our experimental results.   
 
136 Id. at 22 (quoting Equity-Linked Inv’rs, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del. Ch. 1997)). 
137See id. at 19 (“The fact that some holders of shares might be market participants who are eager to sell and would 
prefer a higher near-term market price likewise does not alter the presumptively long-term fiduciary focus.”). 
138 More precisely 189 out of 486 subjects took the certain choice in our experiments, combining the loss and no-loss 
versions.  Considering only the no-loss experiments, 35.8% (111 out of 310 subjects) took the certain choice. 
139 We also did not have subjects actually try to invent anything, preferring to keep the experimental design simple.  
In the future, we may incorporate a creative task as part of the experiment. 
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*  *  *  *  * 
 
 To sum up, our experiments suggested that people appear to become decidedly less risk 
averse when placed in a frame that entails having them invest in an invention, rather than a “Simple 
Lottery” frame.  This result might lead us to worry less about the “risk” problem of inducing 
individuals to invest in inventions, concentrating, instead, on the copying problem. Particular 
doctrines in patent and corporate law could be modified, based on our results. Thus, there may be 
a public policy payoff to our results.  Again, we should caution against relying too strongly on 
these implications at this stage.  More work needs to be done.  Still, we find the direction of the 
implications somewhat comforting. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 A central challenge to formulating sound legal policy is calibrating institutions 
appropriately to provide incentives (or disincentives) around activities of interest. Such design 
calculus is inherently difficult, and it is often complicated by the perceived need to account for 
how risk preferences affect actors’ behavior. In certain domains that are known to be risk-intensive 
(such as in innovation industries), this added complexity can be daunting. The experiments detailed 
in this article deliver several new results, the most robust of which is directly pertinent to this 
policy-design question. When people confront a risky choice that is framed in the context of 
“Investing in an Invention,” an interesting phenomenon emerges: subjects become significantly 
and substantially less risk averse in their decision making, taking on risky projects that they would 
eschew if framed differently. Our experimental results appear to be robust to a variety of 
demographic variables (e.g., gender, age, subject population), as well as certain situational ones 
(e.g., the prospect of losing money on the risky gamble). However, they appear to depend critically 
on the contextual nature of the frame: removing the “Invention” component of the framing, for 
example, causes the effect to dissipate.  
 To the extent our results are generalizable, they have material implications for legal policy. 
They suggest that—at least in pertinent domains—accounting for risk aversion may be slightly 
less critical than in other risky contexts. Consequently, policy makers in such domains may be able 
to narrow their sights (at least a little) to concentrate on the other elements of legal and regulatory 
design that are of first-order importance. 
 We view these findings as contributing to a still-small but growing body of experimental 
work on intellectual property and its role in economics, psychology and law.  Many of the most 
interesting questions, having to do with the responsiveness of investment to the strength of patent 
protection and how scientists respond to incentives to invent, remain largely unexplored terrain 
awaiting exploration. And embarking on that quest is a risk we should all be willing to take. 
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APPENDIX A:  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND IDENTIFICATION 
 
 As a theoretical matter, we represent subject choices within a generalized expected utility 
(GEU) choice-theoretic framework.140  In our framework, our experimental manipulation (the 
“Invest in Invention” frame) represents a controlled shock to subjects’ underlying risk preferences, 
possibly inducing them to think about risk aversion differently than they would otherwise behave 
were the equivalent economic choice framed as a strict gamble.141 
 The discussion below proceeds in two stages:  First, we discuss the underlying choice-
theoretic framework, and the predicted effect of the manipulation.  Second, we consider an 
empirical calibration and identification strategy, along with giving results from the first set of 
“baseline” experiments. 
 
A. Choice Theoretic Framework 
 
Our aggregate results can also be situated in a decision-theoretic context, where one can 
conceive of the “Invest in Invention” frame as causing a downward shift in subjects’ manifest risk 
aversion, thereby causing them to embrace a risky choice more readily than they would in the 
absence of the manipulation.  While we relegate the derivation of this framework to the Appendix, 
we are attempting to control for subjects’ baseline risk aversion parameter (𝛼* ) and other 
demographic variables (𝑋+), and estimate the local average treatment effect of a downward shock 
(𝜆 < 0) that the experimental condition introduces (i.e., revealed risk aversion goes down in the 
presence of the manipulation). 
 In particular, suppose that the relevant population exhibits CRRA preferences scaled by a 
(type dependent) CRRA risk aversion parameter 𝛼(𝑋+), so that: 
 𝛼(𝑋!) = 𝛼" + 𝜆 ∙ 𝜏! + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋! + ε! , (1) 
 
where 𝜏+ is a dummy variable set to one if the subject is assigned to the treatment group, and ε+ 
represents a noise term (which we assume to be have zero mean and to be distributed according to 
the cumulative distribution function for the population, Φ(ε+)).142 
 It is important to note that our experimental data on risk preferences appears comparable 
to that found in the prior literature more generally.  We could deploy this literature in two ways.  
Under the first (a “bootstrapping”) approach, we would use the baseline preference parameter 
estimates from pre-existing studies to impose similar structural constraints on the risk preference 
distributions of our own subjects.  Under the second, we would use the results of the literature as 
a rough benchmark of comparison for our own sample of subjects, but then (after ensuring rough 
comparability) use our subjects’ own behaviors to identify the distribution of preferences.  The 
advantage of the first approach is that it facilitates comparability of our results to the existing 
 
140 See Colin Camerer & Eric Talley, Experimental Study of Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 9-10(A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“[T]he crucial component of generalizability is whether a theory 
carefully distinguishes between behavior of students playing for modest stakes”).  
141 See Richard E. Kihlstrom & Jean-Jacques Laffont, A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory of Firm 
Formation Based on Risk Aversion, 87 J. of Pol’y Econ. 719, 719 (1979) (explaining that, in “equilibrium, more risk 
averse individuals become workers while the less risk averse become entrepreneurs.”). 
142 A natural assumption given the structure of our data is that εi is normally distributed (implying a Probit 
specification); but it easily confirmed that a variety of other distributional assumptions for Φ(.) work as well.  
See Appendix A. 
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literature.  The advantage of the second approach is that it allows us to control for an assortment 
of variables (e.g., demographic differences) that might be predictive of risk aversion but not easily 
observed in summary statistics reported in the existing literature. 
 We employ the latter approach. Below, we first confirm that our experimental data appear 
comparable to what has been found in prior literature, focusing particularly on HL as a benchmark; 
and second, having found our experimental control group data to be comparable, we proceed to 
use those data as a baseline for teasing out the effect of our manipulation. 
 Each subject i is presumed to have individual risk preference characteristics summarized 
by a (potentially type-dependent) risk aversion parameter 𝛼(𝑋+)	ϵ	ℝ, where 𝑋+ represents a vector 
of subject characteristics (e.g., demographics).  While 𝛼(𝑋+) could take any functional form, we 
will frequently concentrate on linear relationships, so that: 
 
 𝛼(𝑋+) = 𝛼* + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋+,  
 
where 𝛼*  is a constant representing a “baseline” level of risk aversion and 𝛽  is a vector of 
coefficients on subject characteristics 𝑋+. 
 In both treatment and control groups, the subject faces a choice between a “sure thing” 
(ST) and a “risky venture” (RV).  Project ST pays off 𝑉 > 0 with certainty, while RV pays off 𝑉, > 𝑉 with probability 𝑞 and 𝑉-	ϵ	(0, 𝑉) with probability (1 − 𝑞), where 𝑞 ∈ (0,1).  We assume 
that 𝑞𝑉, + (1 − 𝑞)𝑉- > 𝑉, so that an unbiased, risk-neutral party would always prefer RV to ST.  
As noted above, the experimental vignette set forth V = $8; VH = $30; VL = $3; and q = 1/3, which 
clearly satisfies this condition. 
 We suppose for concreteness that subjects are heterogeneously risk-averse, exhibiting 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions.  Equivalently, the utility subject i gets 
from realized income 𝑦+, or 𝑢(𝑦+; 𝛼+), can be represented as follows: 
 𝑢(𝑦+; 𝛼+) = 𝑦+./((0!)1 − 𝛼(𝑋+) 
 
Recall that this function converges to ln	(𝑦+)  as 𝛼(𝑋+) ⟶ 1.  The special case of 𝛼(𝑋+) = 0 
corresponds to risk neutrality, while 𝛼(𝑋+) > 0  corresponds to risk aversion, and 𝛼(𝑋+) < 0 
corresponds to a preference for risk. 
 Given this set of preferences, subject i will (weakly) prefer the risky venture (RV) to the 
sure thing (ST) if and only if: 
 𝑢H𝑅𝑉; 𝛼(𝑋+)J = 𝑞 ∙ 𝑉,./((0!)1 − 𝛼(𝑋+) + (1 − 𝑞) ∙ 𝑉-./((0!)1 − 𝛼(𝑋+) ≥ 𝑉./((0!)1 − 𝛼(𝑋+) = 𝑢(𝑆𝑇; 𝛼(𝑋+)) 
 
or equivalently: 𝑞 ∙ 𝑉,./((0!) + (1 − 𝑞) ∙ 𝑉-./((0!) ≥ 𝑉./((0!) 
 
 Given our parameterization, there is a unique risk aversion level, 𝛼(𝑋+) = 𝛼∗, in which the 
above expression is satisfied at equality, and the subject is indifferent between ST and RV.  She 
thus prefers ST when 𝛼(𝑋+) > 𝛼∗, and prefers RV when 𝛼(𝑋+) < 𝛼∗.  For the specific numerical 
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values utilized in our experimental setting,143 it is easily verified that the unique indifference point 
occurs at 𝛼∗ ≈ 0.66. 
 We represent our experimental manipulation as potentially introducing a “shock” to the 
baseline level of risk aversion, or 𝛼* from above, to a new value 𝛼. = 𝛼* + 𝜆 < 𝛼*.  Note that 
because our “Invest in Invention” frame is designed to reduce manifest aversion to risk, we 
hypothesize the shock to be negative, so that 𝜆 < 0.  The shock will not affect all subjects equally:  
For infra- and extra-marginal subjects (for whom risk aversion	𝛼(𝑋+) was much less or much 
greater than the critical switch value 𝛼∗), the manipulation will not affect preference orderings.  
However, for near “marginal” subjects where 𝛼(𝑋+) is in the vicinity of 𝛼∗, our manipulation can 
induce a change in behavior from favoring ST to favoring RV.  That is, denoting the dummy 
variable 𝜏+ to represent assignment to the control (0) or treatment (1) group, we would expect to 
find a group of subjects for which:  
 
     𝛼* + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋+ + 𝜆 ∙ 𝜏+ < 𝛼∗ < 𝛼* + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋+ 
 
 In other words, if our manipulation has the effect we posit, we would expect a 
disproportional preference for RV relative to ST in the treatment group compared to the control 
group.  We therefore seek an identification strategy that will allow us to estimate 𝜆, and to test the 
null hypothesis that 𝜆 = 0 against the (one-sided) alternative that 𝜆 < 0. 
 
B. Calibration to the Literature 
 
 As noted above, one unavoidable limitation of drawing on results from prior literature is 
that granular information on the subjects’ demographics (or the 𝑋+s) is rarely if ever reported in 
usable form.  Thus, the best one can do is to benchmark on summary statistics (effectively dropping 
all of the 𝑋+s other than a dummy variable indicating whether the subject was in our experimental 
control group).  
 Moreover, in both our experiment and in the prior literature, one cannot observe subjects’ 
true baseline values of 𝛼*.  The best one can do is to infer plausible ranges of values from revealed 
preference orderings within a specific hypothetical vignette.  A common vignette in the literature 
concerns the “switch point” on the HL scale at which the probability of a successful outcome grows 
sufficiently favorable that a subject first chooses the high-variance project (Option B in the table 
below, with respective high and low payoffs of VHH and VLL) over the low variance project (Option 
A, with respective payoffs of VH and VL, where VH <VHH and VL >VLL).  Specifically, if the subject 
first switches from to Project B when the success probability is equal to qk , it follows that: 
 𝑞2 ∙ 𝑉,,./( + (1 − 𝑞2) ∙ 𝑉--./( ≥ 𝑞2 ∙ 𝑉,./( + (1 − 𝑞2) ∙ 𝑉-./( 
 
Because the subject did not switch at success probability 𝑞2/., it must also be true that: 
 𝑞2/. ∙ 𝑉,,./( + (1 − 𝑞2/.) ∙ 𝑉--./( < 𝑞2/. ∙ 𝑉,./( + (1 − 𝑞2/.) ∙ 𝑉-./( 
 
 
143 I.e., V = $8; VH = $30; VL = $3; and q = 1/3. 
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 Plugging the numerical values from Table 1A into each of these expressions and then 
solving for the unknown coefficient 𝛼 allows one to use the first switch point to infer plausible 
range of risk aversion coefficient values (𝛼), depicted in the final column of the table below:144 
 
 
Table 1A: Holt-Laury (2002) Risk-Aversion Elicitation Bins 
 
 In addition, we must further allow for the possibility that a subject would never switch 
within the HL experimental protocol, even when the chance of the high payoff reached 100%.  
This is no doubt inconsistent with any type of rational choice theoretically, but we found that 
approximately 2.7 percent of our subjects never switched to option B in our HL elicitation.  We 
therefore place these subjects into an 11th bin, which we call 𝐴.., and which cannot be rank-
ordered against the others.145  Through the HL elicitation question, we observe a series of dummy 
variables 𝑧+,2 , which reflect whether bin 𝐴2 contains the first bin at which i switches to Option B, 
for bins 𝑘 ∈ {1,2, … ,10,11}.   
 To assess our experimental data side-by-side against the HL results, we simulated a data 
set replicating the summary statistics of HL.  Because the HL data do not include any granular 
controls, we control (at this stage) only for a single dummy variable:  whether the subject was part 
of our experimental data, and in particular part of the control group.  Note that if the error terms 
are normally distributed, an ordered probit is the natural choice. 
 
 
Fig. 1A Subjects' Holt-Laury Switch Bins (Solid Lines; Gains Only & Lose-Money Condition) 
versus Original Holt-Laury (2002) Switch Distribution (Dotted Lines) 
 
144 The HL elicitation subdivides the risk aversion domain A into K=10 ordered “bins” coinciding with: {𝐴"|𝐴#…𝐴$|𝐴"%} ={(−∞, −1.713]|(−1.713,−0.947]|… |(0.971,1.368]|(1.368,∞)} 
145 Our results change little if the “never switch” subjects are dropped entirely from our data set. 
Low	Variance High	Variance
Option	A	(Low	Variation) Option	B	(High	Variation) Switch	Point	 Þ a
$0.10 10%	chance	of	$2.00	and	90%	chance	of	$1.60 10%	chance	of	$3.85	and	90%	chance	of	$0.10 a	≤	-1.713
$0.10 20%	chance	of	$2.00	and	80%	chance	of	$1.60 20%	chance	of	$3.85	and	80%	chance	of	$0.10 -1.713	<		 a	≤	-0.947
$0.10 30%	chance	of	$2.00	and	70%	chance	of	$1.60 30%	chance	of	$3.85	and	70%	chance	of	$0.10 -0.947	<		 a	≤	-0.487
$0.10 40%	chance	of	$2.00	and	60%	chance	of	$1.60 40%	chance	of	$3.85	and	60%	chance	of	$0.10 -0.487	<		 a	≤	-0.143
$0.10 50%	chance	of	$2.00	and	50%	chance	of	$1.60 50%	chance	of	$3.85	and	50%	chance	of	$0.10 -0.143	<		 a	≤	0.146
$0.10 60%	chance	of	$2.00	and	40%	chance	of	$1.60 60%	chance	of	$3.85	and	40%	chance	of	$0.10 0.146	<		 a	≤	0.411
$0.10 70%	chance	of	$2.00	and	30%	chance	of	$1.60 70%	chance	of	$3.85	and	30%	chance	of	$0.10 0.411	<		 a	≤	0.676
$0.10 80%	chance	of	$2.00	and	20%	chance	of	$1.60 80%	chance	of	$3.85	and	20%	chance	of	$0.10 0.676	<		 a	≤	0.971
$0.10 90%	chance	of	$2.00	and	10%	chance	of	$1.60 90%	chance	of	$3.85	and	10%	chance	of	$0.10 0.971	<		 a	≤	1.368
$0.10 100%	chance	of	$2.00	and	0%	chance	of	$1.60 100%	chance	of	$3.85	and	0%	chance	of	$0.10 a	>	1.368
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 Consider Figure 1, which illustrates the cumulative frequency of switch-point bins, both 
for the four original HL conditions (dashed lines) and our various experimental baseline subjects 
(solid lines).  As can be seen from the figure, our subjects appear to manifest a somewhat greater 
degree of risk aversion at the upper end of the HL scale than most of the HL conditions (other than 
the 20x real stakes condition).  That said, our subjects appear to behave consistently in a manner 
that sits comfortably within the range of responses in HL.  Moreover, note that our treatment and 
control subjects manifest nearly identical switch point distributions—a fact that we will utilize in 
our identification strategy below.  Overall, we consider this to be reasonable grounds to believe 
that our data are highly comparable to HL, albeit possibly skewed slightly (but insignificantly) 
towards greater risk aversion. 146   This comparison provides some comfort that our data are 
comparable to both prior literature, as well as one another regardless of whether subjects they were 
assigned to the control or treatment group. 
 
C. Identification 
 
  Let 𝑦+ ∈ {0,1} denote whether the subject takes the {risky, safe} decision.147  We 
use the standard limited dependent variable approach to estimate coefficients underlying the binary 
choice between projects.  Assume that there is some “latent” risk aversion variable 𝑦T+ for each 
experimental subject, which cannot be observed directly.  For subject i the latent variable is defined 
by: 
 𝑦T+ = 𝛼* + 𝜆 ∙ 𝜏+ + 𝛽𝑋+ + 𝛿𝑧+ + 𝜀+ 
 
The subject’s action in is dictated by this latent variable, such that: 
 𝑦+ = W1	𝑖𝑓	𝑦T+ ≥ 0𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  
 
 In the above setup, 𝛼* is an estimated constant, representing baseline risk aversion; 𝛽 is a 
vector of control-variable coefficients on demographic variables 𝑋+ , and 𝛿 is a vector of “fixed 
effect” coefficients for (K-1) of the HL “bins” subjects fall into.  Our coefficient of interest in this 
expression will be 𝜆,  which embodies the marginal effect of being placed in the innovation 
“language” treatment group, (where 𝜏+ = 1), as opposed to the pure risk frame (where 𝜏+ = 0).   
The 𝜀+  denotes an error term on the latent variable.  Because we predict that the “Invest in 
Invention” frame will make subjects less risk averse and more risk preferring, we will test a null 
hypothesis that 𝜆 = 0 against the one-sided alternative that 𝜆 < 0.148  
 
146 Beyond eyeballing, we checked whether our subjects appeared comparable to the simulated HL data based on 
switching bins in an ordered probit/logit specification.  When we compare the pooled HL data to our control group, 
we found a modest bias in the direction of risk aversion among our experimental controls.  However, this bias is not 
statistically significant under conventional measures (z=1.55 & 1.63, respectively).  
147 Note that we normalize the “safe” decision as 𝑦& = 1, so that this fits into the standard framework for limited 
dependent variables 
148 One caveat deserves mention here:  Because our other control variables (𝑋! and 𝑧!) are both elicited after the 
experimental manipulation, it is conceivable that the experimental manipulation itself affected post-manipulation 
responses.  This fear is less salient with the demographic variables 𝑋! ,  such as age, left-handedness, etc.  
However, the HL risk aversion elicitation, 𝑧! , might well be altered by being assigned to the treatment or control 
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 Given the framework from above, the risky choice will be taken whenever: 
 𝜀+ ≤ −(𝛼* + 𝛽𝑋+ + 𝛿𝑧+ + 𝜆𝜏+) 
 
which occurs with probability: 
 Φ^/(('$)0!$45!$67!)8 _ 
 
And the safe choice will be taken whenever: 
 𝜀+ > −(𝛼* + 𝛽𝑋+ + 𝛿𝑧+ + 𝜆𝜏+) 
 
which occurs with probability: 1 − Φ^/(('$)0!$45!$67!)8 _ 
 
 Suppose that out of our N subjects, we observe n<N of them choose the safe choice (𝑦+ =1) and the remaining N-n choose the risky choice (𝑦+ = 0).  The appropriate likelihood function is 
defined as follows: Λ(𝛼*, 𝛽, 𝛿, 𝜆) =abΦ^/(('$)0!$45!$67!)8 _c./9!:+;. b1 − Φ^/(('$)0!$45!$67!)8 _c9! 
 
The log likelihood function is: 
 lnHΛ(𝛼*, 𝛽, 𝛿, 𝜆)J = d(1 − 𝑦+) ∙ ln eΦ^/(('$)0!$45!$67!)8 _f:+;. + 𝑦+ ∙ ln e1 − Φ^/(('$)0!$45!$67!)8 _f 
 
 The maximum likelihood approach chooses 𝛼*, 𝛽, 𝛿, 𝜆 -- as well as 𝜎 -- to maximize the 
above function.  As before, given our normality assumptions on 𝜀+ , a Probit specification is 
appropriate. 
 As noted above, if the “Invest in Invention” frame has no effect, then one would predict 𝜆 = 0.  If, in contrast, treatment makes subjects less risk averse and more risk preferring on the 
margin, then we would predict 𝜆 < 0, we will test the null hypothesis that 𝜆 = 0 against the one-
sided alternative that 𝜆 < 0.  
  
 
group.  Were this to happen, it would likely attenuate any results we find, which is good news for us.  That said, 
this possible treatment effect on a RHS variable is worth keeping in mind in interpreting the regressions below; 
we will thus consider specifications that both exclude and include fixed effects for HL bins reported by the 
subjects.  We note, however, that the HL elicitations from our experimental control and treatment subjects appear 
virtually identical, giving us some confidence that the HL bins are not infected by our experimental manipulation 
shown in Figure 1 above. 
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APPENDIX B:  ROBUSTNESS TEST: KEEP VS. INVEST IN INVENTION 
 
 The following tables report on alternative probit and logit estimations of Tables 6 and 7 in 
the text, which used OLS linear probability models. Converting to average marginal effects, these 
estimates imply that for a subject with a median level of risk aversion, we would predict a 16- to 
18-percent lower rate of opting for the certain option when in the invention frame. 
 
 
 
 
  
Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 3 Probit 4 Probit 5 Probit 6 Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3 Logit 4 Logit 5 Logit 6
INVENTION FRAME -0.291* -0.421*** -0.421*** -0.384*** -0.488** -0.487** -0.470* -0.685*** -0.686*** -0.646*** -0.849* -0.851**
(-2.31) (-3.11) (-3.10) (-2.80) (-2.41) (-2.41) (-2.31) (-3.01) (-3.01) (-2.77) (-2.32) (-2.34)
GAMBLED 0.064 -0.049 -0.125 -0.122 0.115 -0.097 -0.209 -0.208
(0.44) (-0.31) (-0.77) (-0.76) (0.47) (-0.36) (-0.74) (-0.74)
AGE 0.027*** 0.004 0.002 0.047*** 0.008 0.004
(3.40) (0.40) (0.19) (3.41) (0.48) (0.25)
MALE -0.059 -0.159 -0.018 -0.07 -0.251 0.011
(-0.42) (-1.08) (-0.09) (-0.29) (-0.99) (0.03)
HAND -0.052 -0.056 -0.056 -0.084 -0.1 -0.094
(-0.28) (-0.29) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-0.30) (-0.28)
ETHNICITY 0.181 0.139 0.126 0.316 0.265 0.239
(1.07) (0.82) (0.74) (1.11) (0.92) (0.83)
TURK 0.626* 0.836** 1.003* 1.363**
(2.32) (2.53) (2.23) (2.48)
MALE x TURK -0.304 -0.533
(-1.05) (-1.07)
CONSTANT -0.144 0.254 0.202 -0.471 -0.081 -0.093 -0.23 0.412 0.321 -0.81 -0.15 -0.168
(-1.62) (0.64) (0.49) (-1.05) (-0.18) (-0.21) (-1.62) (0.65) (0.49) (-1.15) (-0.21) (-0.24)
Chi-sqd 5.335 74.016 74.127 76.842 92.892 92.718 5.314 66.627 66.658 68.9 81.338 80.747
p 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 412 412 412 412 412 412 412 412 412 412 412 412
HL Switch FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
T-Statistics in Parentheses
+ = Significant at 5% (one tailed test); 10% (two tailed test)
* = Significant at 2.5% (one tailed test); 5% (two tailed test)
** = Significant at 1% (one tailed test); 2% (two tailed test)
*** = Significant at 0.5% (one tailed test); 1% (two tailed test)
Table B1: Baseline Experiments - Probit and Logit Specifications when Losing Money Not Possible
Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 3 Probit 4 Probit 5 Probit 6 Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3 Logit 4 Logit 5 Logit 6
LANGUAGE -0.225+ -0.268* -0.265+ -0.272* -0.291* -0.298* -0.359+ -0.442* -0.437* -0.448* -0.483* -0.493*
(-1.69) (-1.96) (-1.94) (-1.98) (-2.07) (-2.12) (-1.69) (-1.99) (-1.96) (-2.00) (-2.10) (-2.14)
GAMBLED -0.11 -0.104 -0.086 -0.095 -0.174 -0.163 -0.134 -0.151
(-0.77) (-0.69) (-0.57) (-0.62) (-0.75) (-0.67) (-0.55) (-0.61)
AGE 0.002 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.014 0.012
(0.33) (0.90) (0.75) (0.32) (0.92) (0.76)
GENDER -0.082 -0.046 0.064 -0.144 -0.085 0.091
(-0.56) (-0.31) (0.30) (-0.61) (-0.35) (0.27)
HAND -0.034 -0.051 -0.044 -0.042 -0.06 -0.055
(-0.12) (-0.19) (-0.16) (-0.09) (-0.13) (-0.12)
ETHNICITY -0.017 0.023 0.012 -0.024 0.047 0.032
(-0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (-0.07) (0.14) (0.10)
TURK -0.2 -0.053 -0.338 -0.097
(-0.92) (-0.18) (-0.95) (-0.20)
MALE x TURK -0.212 -0.345
(-0.73) (-0.73)
CONSTANT 0.082 0.54 0.628 0.598 0.519 0.508 0.131 0.885 1.028 0.985 0.857 0.835
(0.88) (1.39) (1.53) (1.30) (1.11) (1.09) (0.88) (1.36) (1.50) (1.28) (1.10) (1.07)
Chi-sqd 2.87 24.304 25.083 25.373 25.748 26.139 2.863 22.608 23.384 23.578 23.751 24.1
p 0.09 0.012 0.014 0.064 0.079 0.097 0.091 0.02 0.025 0.099 0.126 0.152
N 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360
HL Switch FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
T-Statistics in Parentheses
+ = Significant at 5% (one tailed test); 10% (two tailed test)
* = Significant at 2.5% (one tailed test); 5% (two tailed test)
** = Significant at 1% (one tailed test); 2% (two tailed test)
*** = Significant at 0.5% (one tailed test); 1% (two tailed test)
Table B2: Baseline Experiments - Probit and Logit Specifications when Losing Money Not Possible
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APPENDIX C:  ROBUSTNESS TEST: KEEP VS. INVEST 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5   
INVENTION FRAME -0.015 -0.008 -0.005 -0.019 -0.019   
  (-0.21) (-0.11) (-0.07) (-0.26) (-0.26)   
GAMBLED     0.077 0.062 0.062   
      (0.89) (0.73) (0.73)   
AGE       0.005 0.005   
        (1.48) (1.48)   
GENDER       -0.023 -0.023   
        (-0.31) (-0.31)   
HAND       0.1 0.1   
        (0.86) (0.86)   
ETHNICITY       -0.137 -0.137   
        (-1.31) (-1.31)   
CONSTANT 0.611*** 0.576*** 0.508** 0.405 0.405   
  (11.83) (2.93) (2.44) (1.60) (1.60)   
R-sqd 0.00 0.059 0.064 0.097 0.097   
p 0.8320 0.1490 0.2220 0.0450 0.0450   
N 184 184 184 184 184   
HL Switch FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Table C1: Robustness Experiments - Invest with no Invention (OLS Estimates)   
  T-Statistics in Parentheses       
  + = Significant at 5% (one tailed test); 10% (two tailed test)   
  * = Significant at 2.5% (one tailed test); 5% (two tailed test)   
  ** = Significant at 1% (one tailed test); 2% (two tailed test)   
  *** = Significant at 0.5% (one tailed test); 1% (two tailed test)   
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APPENDIX D:  ROBUSTNESS TEST: ENDOWMENT ONLY 
 
  Model 2 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5     
KEEP 
LANGUAGE -0.051 -0.036 -0.038 -0.046 -0.05     
  (-0.73) (-0.52) (-0.54) (-0.65) (-0.71)     
GAMBLED     -0.046 -0.046 -0.02     
      (-0.50) (-0.50) (-0.22)     
AGE       0.003 0.001     
        (0.77) (0.35)     
GENDER         -0.131+     
          (-1.76)     
HAND         0.01     
          (0.08)     
ETHNICITY         0.012     
          (0.12)     
CONSTANT 0.461*** 0.669*** 0.702*** 0.617*** 0.675***     
  (9.29) (4.80) (4.57) (3.22) (3.29)     
R-sqd 0.003 0.103 0.105 0.107 0.123     
p 0.094 0.469 0.01 0.011 0.016     
N 202 202 202 202 202     
HL Switch FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Table D1: Robustness Experiments Endowment Only (OLS Estimates)   
  T-Statistics in Parentheses               
  + = Significant at 5% (one tailed test); 10% (two tailed test)       
  * = Significant at 2.5% (one tailed test); 5% (two tailed test)       
  ** = Significant at 1% (one tailed test); 2% (two tailed test)       
  *** = Significant at 0.5% (one tailed test); 1% (two tailed test)       
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